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Abstract: This research analyzes numerous proposals to modify the Tier III and related 
inadmissibility provisions in the Immigration and Nationality Act which have been recommended 
since the latest relevant legislative changes in 2007. Using the most common criticisms of the 
Tier III and related inadmissibility provisions to measure potential impact of the proposals, as 
well as Congressional and Federal opinion of the Tier III inadmissibility in general, this project 
will aim to decipher which of the proposals has the greatest potential to be enacted. In the end, 
this analysis recommends first the institution of expanded waiver/exemption authority for 
relieving individuals or groups of the Tier III and related inadmissibility provisions, followed by 
the institution of the statutory reform corresponding to the most successfully implemented 
waivers. 
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During the 1970s and early 1980s, the African National Congress (ANC)—leading 
organization in the South African anti-apartheid movement and led by Nelson Mandela—was 
classified as a terrorist organization by the U.S. government. By 1986 the U.S. Congress was 
issuing resolutions calling for Nelson Mandela’s release from prison.1 Several decades later, the 
counterterrorism immigration terms of the USA PATRIOT Act again implicated Mandela as a 
terrorist under the inadmissibility provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). 
These provisions required Mandela to receive special permission to travel to the United States 
by virtue of his involvement in the ANC, classified as an “undesignated” or “Tier III” terrorist 
organization via the PATRIOT Act’s modifications to the INA. Senator Judd Gregg of New 
Hampshire called Mandela’s inclusion in the Tier III inadmissibility a “bureaucratic snafu.”2 
The fact remains however, that Nelson Mandela was for a short time officially denied 
admissibility to the United States by U.S. immigration law.  Many other individuals—some living 
in the U.S. for decades and applying for citizenship, others seeking asylum, others simply 
attempting to immigrate—have been barred by the same statutes. So is this indeed an instance of 
bureaucratic snafu? Is it a matter of nascent legislation working through early idiosyncrasies? 
Or is Nelson Mandela’s case evidence of a greater, systemic issue with the provisions of the INA? 
This project seeks to answer these questions. 
 
  
                                                 
1
 Kidane, Won. (2010.)  “The Terrorism Bar to Asylum in Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and the United 
States: Transporting Best Practices.” Fordham International Law Journal. Vol. 33: 365. 
2
 Hall, Mimi. 2008. “U.S. has Mandela on terrorist list.” USA Today. April 30, 2008. 
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I. Introduction 
The terrorism-related inadmissibility grounds (TRIG), found in §212(a)(3)(B) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), are the mechanism by which the U.S. government is 
able to bar terrorist organizations and those inciting terrorist activity from entry into the United 
States. As a result of modifications to the INA by the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, the TRIG 
provisions divide the classification of a terrorist organization into three levels, or tiers, the third 
of which is the subject of this analysis. Tier III defines an “undesignated” terrorist organization 
as “a group of two or more individuals, whether organized or not, which engages in, or has a 
subgroup which engages in, the [terrorist] activities described in subclauses (I) through (VI) of 
clause (iv).”3 These activities include: to commit or incite to commit, to plan or prepare, to 
gather information for, or to solicit funds for a terrorist activity or terrorist organization, or to 
solicit an individual to engage in this conduct or for membership to a Tier I, II, or III terrorist 
organization, or to commit an act the actor reasonably should know affords material support to a 
Tier I, II, or III terrorist organization or activity.4 
The Tier III provision, especially in combination with the material support clause of the 
INA (as amended by the Real ID Act of 2005) has come under harsh criticism from the policy 
and academic communities alike for being fundamentally too broad and indiscriminate in its 
applicability. Others argue that the breadth of the provisions is necessary for the maximization of 
discretionary authority of government officials. As a result of the debate, several proposals for 
changes to the statutes and their execution have been recommended. This project is undertaken 
in reaction to these proposed modifications.  
                                                 
3
 Immigration and Nationality Act. 8 U.S.C. 1182 §212(a)(3)(B)(vi)(III). 
4
 Immigration and Nationality Act. 8 U.S.C. 1182 §212(a)(3)(B)(iv). 
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The value of this study is in its synthesis of these proposals, which are made by a variety 
of sources in conjunction with various arguments about the justice and equity of the TRIG 
provisions and related issues. The proposals are often made as part of a list of varied, 
independent potential changes, as part of several changes recommended together, or embedded 
in a broader exploration of terrorism and immigration issues. The proposals have not, until this 
point, been discussed in comparison to one another, nor has their potential impact been evaluated 
individually with respect to a pre-defined criterion. This study thus contributes an initial, 
comparative analysis of the proposals which may be used for consideration of the proposals in 
future policymaking and academic work. 
This project will specifically consider eight such proposals in the context of an 
“adoptionimplementationimpact” framework. This simple framework allows the project to 
consider discretely the potential effects (impact) of the proposals separate from their ability to be 
enacted (adoption).  The eight proposals to be considered are: 
1. No modification to the application of Tier III, nor to the current process of adjudicating 
cases and waiver issuance. 
2. Modification of the exemption/waiver processes via expanded categories or authority for 
issuing of exemptions/waivers. 
3. Creation of a de minimis level of material support or of a more restricted definition of 
material support to terrorist organizations.  
4. Creation of an exception for material support provided under duress. 
5. Introduction of the elements of “intent” and/or representation of a threat to national 
security into the Tier III provision.  
6. Do not apply the Tier III provision retroactively, that is to groups which have given up 
terrorist activities or for activities which ceased prior to the enactment of the relevant 
legislation. 
7. Introduction of a “designated” list of Tier III terrorist organizations. 
8. Removal of the Tier III provision. 
The project firstly culls the key criticisms of the Tier III and related provisions from 
literature and public comment. The three primary criticisms are then used as the criterion against 
which the impact of the proposals is evaluated. These criticisms are: that the Tier III definition of 
McCarthy 6 
 
an undesignated terrorist organization itself is too broad, that the TRIG provisions as amended 
by the USA PATRIOT Act and the Real ID Act present unfair and largely inadvertent bars to 
refugees and asylum seekers, and that the provisions have resulted in a crippling bureaucratic 
backlog of immigration cases qualifying for TRIG inadmissibility. The “impact” piece of the 
analysis considers theoretically whether each proposal, if implemented, would affect these three 
criticisms. This constitutes the bulk of this project’s analysis. Such a discussion is mainly 
theoretical, as no world exists where each proposal could be implemented and then measured for 
its effects. The consideration of a proposal’s impact is done by comparing the content of the 
proposal to the content of the TRIG provisions currently, and then extrapolating out to estimate 
the effects of the modifications.  
The analysis finally briefly considers the “adoptability” of the proposals given the 
political context and the limitation/sanction of discretionary authority which the proposal entails. 
The brief consideration of adoptability is meant to ground the feasibility of implementing the 
proposals as explored in the “impact” analysis.  
Ultimately, this project puts forth the recommendation that Proposal 2 for modification of 
the exemption/waiver processes be enacted immediately. Additionally, after sufficient time for 
considering its success has occurred, and if the imposition of Proposal 2 has been successful, this 
project recommends the institution of other proposals whose provisions correspond to the 
expanded waiver/exemption authority in Proposal 2.  Thus those conditions for which waivers 
have been extended and which have been politically and strategically successful can be made 
permanent by their institution in the statutory language or standard interpretation of the TRIG 
provisions.   
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II. Defining Terrorism 
 Almost every project relating to terrorism—its perpetrators, its occurrence or its effects—
will address the ongoing effort to define it; this paper is no exception. Here it is critical to begin 
by exploring currently accepted definitions of terrorism, since the subject of the debate is 
fundamentally about the acceptability of a single one: the Tier III definition of an “undesignated 
terrorist organization.” Resolving the question of what is or should be the accepted definition of 
terrorism in the academic or policy communities is not the purpose of this discussion, nor of this 
project in its entirety. Nor is it the purpose of the Tier III definition of a terrorist organization to 
reconcile these contending definitions. The following discussion is namely included to provide 
points of comparison for the subsequent discussion of recommendations to modify the Tier III 
provision, and to provide a basis from which the claims of Tier III over-breadth can be 
considered to come.5 
There is no internationally accepted definition of terrorism, though several pieces of 
international legislation have come close to defining it. The Terrorism Convention of 1937, 
while it did not present a definition of terrorism, gave examples of acts which could be 
considered terrorism, including: willful acts causing death or bodily injury to Heads of States, 
willful damage to public property, or willful endangerment of public lives.6 More recently, in 
1999 the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism was 
adopted by the United Nations General Assembly. It comes close to offering a definition of 
terrorism, saying: 
1. Any person commits an offence within the meaning of this Convention if that person 
by any means, directly or indirectly, unlawfully and wilfully, provides or collects funds 
                                                 
5
 See the Quick Reference: Definitions of Terrorism Table II.1 at the close of this section. 
6
 Kidane, Won. (2010.)  “The Terrorism Bar to Asylum in Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and the United 
States: Transporting Best Practices.” Fordham International Law Journal. Vol. 33: 311. 
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with the intention that they should be used or in the knowledge that they are to be used, in 
full or in part, in order to carry out: 
[…] 
(b) Any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or 
to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of 
armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to 
intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an international 
organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.7 
It is worth noting that both of these conceptualizations of terrorism limit the definition in a way 
which the Tier III definition does not, and that is through the inclusion of motivation.  
There is also no official U.S. government definition of terrorism, but instead each agency 
utilizes its own. Presumably, the adherence to different principles and organizational goals is 
what has resulted in the varied definitions of “terrorism” and “terrorist activity.” 
Hoffman (2006) argues that each of the Federal definitions is created with the goals of 
the specific agency in mind. For instance, the Department of State (DOS) uses the definition 
contained in the Foreign Relations Appropriations Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989. It states that 
terrorism is “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant 
targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.”8 
The Department of Justice (DOJ) utilizes the same definition.9 This definition focuses on the 
substate nature of the actors as well as the noncombatant nature of the victims. Such serves to 
alleviate intergovernmental pressure on the State Department and to make use of the 
international definition of noncombatant, which includes off-duty military personnel.10 
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) definition focuses on the national security 
infrastructure and is less outward looking than the definition adopted by DOS and DOJ. It 
                                                 
7
 UN General Assembly. International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing or Terrorism. 9 December 
1999. (http://www.un.org/law/cod/finterr.htm).  
8
 Foreign Relations Authorization Act Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989.  Pub. L. 100-204, 22 U.S.C. §2656f(d)(2). 
9
 Hoffman, Bruce. 2006. Inside Terrorism. New York: Columbia University Press: 31. 
10
 Ibid, 32. 
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defines terrorism as: “any activity that involves an act that: is dangerous to human life or 
potentially destructive of critical infrastructure or key resources; and…must also appear to be 
intended (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a 
government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass 
destruction, assassination, or kidnapping.”11  
Despite the differences in these definitions, for the purposes of immigration law, the 
definitions of “terrorist organization” and “terrorist activity” contained in the INA’s TRIG 
section are used by all three agencies: DOS, DOJ, and DHS. This represents a convergence with 
regard to immigration issues, but also a divergence from individual agency definitions which are 
utilized for purposes other than immigration. 
Finally, the Department of Defense (DOD) employs the following definition of terrorism: 
“the calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended 
to coerce or to intimidate governments of societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally 
political, religious, or ideological objectives.”12 Hoffman argues that this definition is the most 
complete given its inclusion of motive, violence, and fear.13 
Unsurprisingly, given the varied nature of international and U.S. government definitions 
of terrorism, academic definitions vary widely as well. Perhaps the most widely cited effort to 
define terrorism is Schmid and Jongman’s six-hundred page text, which begins by measuring the 
frequency of certain word elements in 109 different definitions of terrorism. Schmid and 
Jongman (1988) find the elements of “violence, force” to be the most common component 
followed by “political,” “fear, terror emphasized,” “threat,” “(psych.) effects and (anticipated) 
reactions,” “victim-target differentiation,” and “purposive, planned, systematic, organized action” 
                                                 
11
 Ibid, 31. 
12
 Ibid. 
13
 Ibid. 
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to be the most common.  Their own lengthy definition produced as a result of their research 
includes only 16 of the 22 elements, though not the most frequently identified 16.[14][15] This 
points to the inherent misalignment of theirs and others’ definitions, as well as the difficulty in 
creating a single authoritative definition. Albeit the first sentence of the book notes that “the 
search for an adequate definition of terrorism is still on.”16  
Nearly two decades later, Hoffman (2006) criticizes Schmid and Jongman’s lack of a 
definitive conclusion, and aims to define terrorism primarily by differentiating it from other 
types of violence. He conclusively defines terrorism as: 
• ineluctably political in aims and motives;  
• violent—or, equally important, threatens violence;  
• designed to have far-reaching psychological repercussions beyond the immediate victim 
or target;  
• conducted either by an organization with an identifiable chain of command or 
conspiratorial cell structure (whose members wear no uniform or identifying insignia) or 
by individuals or a small collection of individuals directly influenced, motivated, or 
inspired by the ideological aims or example of some existent terrorist movement and/or 
its leaders; and  
• perpetrated by a subnational group or nonstate entity.[17][18] 
 
Grant Wardlaw (1989) similarly defines political terrorism as “the use, or threat of use, of 
violence by an individual or a group, whether acting for or in opposition to established authority, 
when such action is designed to create extreme anxiety and/or fear-inducing effects in a target 
group larger than the immediate victims with the purpose of coercing that group into acceding to 
                                                 
14
 Schmid, Alex P. and Albert J. Jongman. 1988. Political Terrorism. New York: North-Holland Publishing 
Company: 28.  
15
 Please see Quick Reference chart for full definition. 
16
 Schmid, Alex P. and Albert J. Jongman. 1988. Political Terrorism. New York: North-Holland Publishing 
Company: Chapter 1. 
17 Hoffman, Bruce. 2006. Inside Terrorism. New York: Columbia University Press: 43. 
18
 Hoffman also importantly notes that no terrorist would identify himself as such, as a criminal would. “The 
terrorist…will never acknowledge that he is a terrorist and moreover will go to great lengths to evade and obscure 
any such inference or connection.” The assertion that terrorists are resistant to identify themselves represents an 
interesting irony with regard to immigration law. Immigrants applying for status in the U.S. are required to disclose 
anything which might make them ineligible for admission, and so most individuals barred by the TRIG provisions 
have effectively labeled themselves as terrorists or as complicit in terrorist activity. 
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the political demands of the perpetrators.”19 His definition differs from Hoffman’s in that it does 
not require that terrorism to be perpetrated by an organized group. However, Wardlaw’s 
definition does include elements of threat and psychological repercussions common to 
Hoffman’s definition. 
In summary, each academic definition includes 1) the element of violence or threat 
thereof, 2) political motives (Schmid and Jongman also include criminal or other, idiosyncratic 
purposes as valid motives), and 3) effects beyond just the immediate victim. The Federal 
definitions above are each in general agreement with at least two of these elements (the DOS and 
DOJ 1 and 2; DHS with all three; DOD with 1, 2, and likely 3). The 1999 International 
Convention’s definition is in agreement with each of 1) – 3), and both international definitions 
additionally include elements of intent. 
Important to note is that each definition is in distinct disagreement about the perpetrators 
of the terrorist activity. Hoffman’s terrorism is perpetrated by “an organization with an 
identifiable chain of command …or by individuals or a small collection of individuals.” 
Wardlaw’s terrorism is carried out simply by “an individual or a group,” and the 1999 
International Convention merely requires that the act be committed by a “person.” Schmid and 
Jongman’s terrorism is committed by “(semi-)clandestine individual, group, or state actors.” 
None of the Federal working definitions of terrorism allude to the group which carries it out 
except for DOS’s definition which, in contrast to Schmid and Jongman’s allowance of state 
perpetrators, requires the action to be undertaken by substate actors or clandestine agents. Thus it 
is in the conceptualization of the group that commits terrorism where there is the greatest 
                                                 
19 Wardlaw, Grant. 1982. Political Terrorism: Theory, tactics, and counter-measures. New York: Cambridge 
University Press: 16. 
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disagreement among contending definitions. It is therefore unsurprising that heated debate has 
ensued over the INA’s definition of a terrorist organization.  
Each of the above definitions, while specific in its own right, is arguably much narrower 
than the Tier III definition of a terrorist organization contained in the INA: “a group of two or 
more individuals, whether organized or not, which engages in, or has a subgroup which engages 
in…”20 the incitement of, preparation or solicitation for, execution of, or material support to a 
terrorist activity or organization.21 The ambiguity in the Tier III definition leaves room to debate 
the “terrorist” nature of the groups in question, and indeed leads us to the discussion of the 
criticisms of the Tier III and related terrorism-related inadmissibility provisions around which 
this paper is centered.22 
Table II.1 
Quick Reference: Definitions of Terrorism 
International 
Terrorism 
Convention of 1937 
Examples of terrorism include: willful acts causing death or bodily injury to 
Heads of States, willful damage to public property, or willful endangerment 
of public lives. 
  
 
International 
Convention  for the 
Suppression of the 
Financing of 
Terrorism (1999) 
“1. Any person commits an offence within the meaning of this Convention if 
that person by any means, directly or indirectly, unlawfully and wilfully, 
provides or collects funds with the intention that they should be used or in 
the knowledge that they are to be used, in full or in part, in order to carry 
out: [...] (b)Any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to 
a civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in 
a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or 
context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an 
international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.” 
U.S. Government  
Departments of State 
and Justice (Foreign 
Relations 
Appropriations Act, 
Fiscal Years 1988 
and 1989) 
“premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against 
noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually 
intended to influence an audience.” 
                                                 
20
 Immigration and Nationality Act. 8 U.S.C. 1182 §212(a)(3)(B)(vi)(III). 
21
 Immigration and Nationality Act. 8 U.S.C. 1182 §212(a)(3)(B)(iv). 
22
 See Appendix 1 for a discussion of the prevailing definitions of a Social Movement, which can be argued to 
coincide at least as closely to the Tier III definition of a terrorist organization as do these prevailing definitions of 
terrorism. 
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Department of 
Homeland Security 
“any activity that involves an act that: is dangerous to human life or 
potentially destructive of critical infrastructure or key resources; and…must 
also appear to be intended (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; 
(ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or 
(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, 
assassination, or kidnapping.” 
    
Department of 
Defense 
“the calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to 
inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments of societies 
in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological 
objectives.” 
Academic 
Schmid and Jongman 
(1988) 
“Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, 
employed by (semi-)clandestine individual, group, or state actors, for 
idiosyncratic, criminal, or political reasons, whereby—in contrast to 
assassination—the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The 
immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly 
(targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) 
from a target population, and serve as message generators. Threat- and 
violence-based communication processes between terrorist (organization), 
(imperiled) victims, and main targets are used to manipulate the main target 
(audience(s)), turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a 
target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or 
propaganda is primarily sought.”  
    
Wardlaw (1989) 
“the use, or threat of use, of violence by an individual or a group, whether 
acting for or in opposition to established authority, when such action is 
designed to create extreme anxiety and/or fear-inducing effects in a target 
group larger than the immediate victims with the purpose of coercing that 
group into acceding to the political demands of the perpetrators.” 
    
Hoffman (2006) 
“Terrorism is: ineluctably political in aims and motives; violent—or, equally 
important, threatens violence; designed to have far-reaching psychological 
repercussions beyond the immediate victim or target; conducted either by an 
organization with an identifiable chain of command or conspiratorial cell 
structure (whose members wear no uniform or identifying insignia) or by 
individuals or a small collection of individuals directly influenced, 
motivated, or inspired by the ideological aims or example of some existent 
terrorist movement and/or its leaders; and perpetrated by a subnational 
group or nonstate entity.” 
Tier III 
§212 (a)(3)(B) of the 
Immigration and 
Nationality Act 
“a group of two or more individuals, whether organized or not, which 
engages in, or has a subgroup which engages in, the [terrorist] activities 
described in subclauses (I) through (VI) of clause (iv),” including: to 
commit or incite to commit, to plan or prepare, to gather information for, or 
to solicit funds for a terrorist activity or terrorist organization, or to solicit an 
individual to engage in this conduct or for membership to a Tier I, II, or III 
terrorist organization, or to commit an act the actor reasonably should know 
affords material support to a Tier I, II, or III terrorist organization or 
activity. 
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III. Legislative Chronology 
 
While many laws published before and after September 11, 2001 have had an effect on 
how the country views and deals with terrorism in the context of immigration policy, several are 
more important for the evolution of the Tier III and related inadmissibility clauses in U.S. 
immigration law today. These are explored here. 
Table III.1 
 
Title Issue Date 
Public Law 
Number, U.S. 
Code/Statutes 
at Large 
Adress; 
relevant 
section 
Relevant Effect with Respect to the Tier III and 
Related Provisions 
McCarran-Walter 
Act; Immigration 
and Nationality Act 
(INA)** 
December 24, 1952 
Primarily 
Chapter 8 
U.S.C. 
Assembled the foundations of existing immigration 
policies and legal practices; governs individuals applying 
to enter the U.S. and persons applying for changes of 
immigration status from within or outside of the U.S. 
Anti-Terrorism Act 
of 1987 (Foreign 
Relations 
Authorization Act 
Fiscal Years 1988 
and 1989) 
December, 22 1987 
Pub. L. 100-
204,  22 U.S.C.; 
§ 2656f(d)(2) 
Established the requirement for the U.S. Department of 
State’s annual submission of country reports on terrorism 
to Congress. Such includes details of terrorist groups 
active that year. 
Immigration Act of 
1990  November 29, 1990 
Pub. L. 101-
649, 104 Stat. 
4978; §601 
Revised the grounds for exclusion in the INA to include 
inadmissibility on the grounds of participation in a 
terrorist organization or a terrorist activity. 
Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death 
Penalty Act of 1996 
June 3, 1996 
Pub. L. 104-
132, 110 Stat. 
1214; §302 
Amended the INA to include §219, codifying the 
Secretary of State’s authority to designate a foreign 
terrorist organization (in addition to the Attorney General 
and consulates’ existing authority to label and individual 
inadmissible for participation in terrorist activities). 
Executive Order 
13224 September 23, 2001 
Title 31 Part 
595 U.S. Code 
Established that the Departments of State or of the 
Treasury may designate “a wider range of entities, 
including terrorist groups, individuals acting as part of a 
terrorist organization, and other entities such as financiers 
and front companies, […] as Specially Designated Global 
Terrorists (SDGTs).”  
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Uniting and 
Strengthening 
America by 
Providing 
Appropriate Tools 
Required to Intercept 
and Obstruct 
Terrorism Act (USA 
PATRIOT Act) 
October 26, 2001 
Pub. L. 107-56, 
115 Stat. 272; 
§411 
Overhauled the terrorism inadmissibility language of the 
INA by adding the Tier II and Tier III definitions of 
terrorist organization and amending the “terrorist activity” 
language. 
Intelligence Reform 
and Terrorism 
Prevention Act of 
2004 
December 17, 2004 
Pub. L. 108-
458, 118 Stat. 
3638; §7119 
Amended the process for designation and re-designation 
of Foreign Terrorist Organizations. 
Real ID Act of 2005 May 11, 2005 
Pub. L. 109-13, 
119 Stat. 302; 
§103 
Amended the material support provision of “engagement 
in terrorist activity” in §212 of the INA. 
Consolidated 
Appropriations Act 
(CAA)  
December 26, 2007 
Pub. L. 110-
161, 121 Stat. 
1844; §691 (a) 
and (b) 
Expanded the Secretary of State’s waiver authority in 
§212(d)(3)(B)(i)  to be able to determine the 
inadmissibility bar inapplicable in certain cases. 
 
Applied automatic relief of the §212(a)(3)(B) provisions 
for “the Hmong and other groups that do not pose a threat 
to the United States” 
Exemption of 
African National 
Congress from 
Treatment as 
Terrorist 
Organization for 
Certain Acts or 
Events Public 
July 1, 2008 
Pub. L. 110-
257, 122 Stat. 
2426  
Amended §691(B) of the CAA to include the African 
National Congress, exonerating any “alien with respect to 
activities undertaken in association with the African 
National Congress in opposition to apartheid rule in South 
Africa.” 
*Information available from the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, “Public Laws Amending the INA” web page 
<http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.eb1d4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a7543f6d1a/?vgnextoid=0c829c7755cb9010VgnVCM10000045f3d6
a1RCRD&vgnextchannel=0c829c7755cb9010VgnVCM10000045f3d6a1RCRD> 
 
 
In October 2001, the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools 
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. 107-56) 
overhauled the terrorism-related inadmissibility language originally placed in the INA by the 
Immigration Act of 1990. While the law previously recognized five categories of terrorism-
related inadmissibility, the USA PATRIOT Act added three more, including: “espousing terrorist 
activity, being the spouse or child of an inadmissible alien associated with a terrorist 
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organization, and intending to engage in activities that could endanger the welfare, safety or 
security of the United States.”23 The USA PATRIOT Act also amended the INA clause defining 
“terrorist activity,” which currently reads: 
(I) The highjacking or sabotage of any conveyance (including an aircraft, vessel, or 
vehicle).  
(II) The seizing or detaining, and threatening to kill, injure, or continue to detain, another 
individual in order to compel a third person (including a governmental organization) to 
do or abstain from doing any act as an explicit or implicit condition for the release of the 
individual seized or detained.  
(III) A violent attack upon an internationally protected person (as defined in section 
1116(b)(4) of title 18, United States Code) or upon the liberty of such a person.  
(IV) An assassination.  
(V) The use of any-  
(aa) biological agent, chemical agent, or nuclear weapon or device, or  
(bb) explosive, firearm, or other weapon or dangerous device (other than for mere 
personal monetary gain), with intent to endanger, directly or indirectly, the safety 
of one or more individuals or to cause substantial damage to property.  
(VI) A threat, attempt, or conspiracy to do any of the foregoing.24  
 
More directly relevant to this study, the USA PATRIOT Act amended the clause defining 
a terrorist organization. The INA provision currently reads: 
(vi) TERRORIST ORGANIZATION DEFINED- As used in this section, the term 
'terrorist organization' means an organization-  
(I) designated under section 219;  
(II) otherwise designated, upon publication in the Federal Register, by the 
Secretary of State in consultation with or upon the request of the Attorney 
General or the Secretary of Homeland Security, as a terrorist organization, after 
finding that the organization engages in the activities described in subclauses (I) 
through (VI) of clause (iv); or  
(III) that is a group of two or more individuals, whether organized or not, which 
engages in, or has a subgroup which engages in, the activities described in 
subclauses (I) through (VI) of clause (iv). 25 
 
Groups labeled terrorist organizations by subclauses I, II, and III of §212 (a)(3)(B)(vi) are 
commonly referred to as Tier I (Foreign Terrorist Organizations), Tier II, or Tier III 
organizations, respectively. The Tier I designation is the most familiar, and requires that the 
                                                 
23
 Doyle, Charles. 2002. The USA PATRIOT Act: A Legal Analysis. (April 15.) Congressional Research Service. 
24
 Immigration and Nationality Act. 8 U.S.C. 1182 §212(a)(3)(B)(iii). 
25
 Immigration and Nationality Act. 8 U.S.C. 1182 §212(a)(3)(B)(vi). 
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organization be a foreign organization, that it be engaged in the terrorist activities described 
above, and that it represent a threat to U.S. national security.26 The Tier III (§212 
(a)(3)(B)(vi)(III)) definition of a terrorist organization is the most general of the three, and is the 
primary subject of this analysis. It defines a terrorist organization widely, not requiring any pre-
determined size or specific organizational structure, nor any specified motivation or effect of the 
activities and goals of the organization.  
The TRIG provisions may be applied to individuals applying for entry into the U.S. or to 
individuals already in the U.S. applying for changes of immigration status. Because the 
provisions do not specify and because they have not been interpreted to apply to activities 
undertaken only after a certain date, the Tier III provision can feasibly apply to any organization 
ever performing a function encompassed by its definition. Therefore the Tier III provision was 
enacted on the date of the passing of the USA PATRIOT Act for any activities of organizations 
qualifying as undesignated terrorist organizations carried out prior to the legislation. For 
activities occurring after October 26, 2001, the provision is applicable on the date of the activity, 
though usually will not be relevant until an individual participant is applying for immigration 
privileges and the inadmissibility is discovered and applied.  
Notable is the fact that subclauses II and III, the newest definitions of terrorist 
organizations resulting from the PATRIOT Act, were not added to the definition of a designated 
Foreign Terrorist Organization in INA §219, but directly into the §212 inadmissibility provisions. 
This means that they are not grounds to be added to the official list of Foreign Terrorist 
Organizations designated by the Secretary of State. By being added instead to §212, the two 
subclauses merely create additional grounds for inadmissibility of persons applying for 
                                                 
26
 (2010) “Foreign Terrorist Organizations.” U.S. Department of State. November 24, 2010. Accessed April 3, 2011 
<http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm>. 
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immigration privileges or changes in immigration status. Furthermore, there is no list of terrorist 
organizations deemed such by subclause III, and as a result Tier III terrorist organizations are 
conventionally called “undesignated terrorist organizations.” (Tier II designations are published 
in the Federal register.27) Tier III is usually “discovered” on an ad hoc basis by consular and 
immigration officials processing immigration cases, and is enacted by the official decision of a 
principal or an individual with the principal’s delegated authority.28 Thus the determination and 
application of the Tier III provision requires significant administrative effort, but allows for 
maximum discretion of bureaucrats and case workers in applying the provision. That is, because 
of the breadth of the definition and the lack of a list, the definition can be liberally interpreted for 
the purposes of barring individuals and groups to whom other inadmissibility provisions may not 
be directly or efficiently applied. 
Directly relevant to the widened grounds considered to constitute membership to a 
terrorist organization is the INA’s definition of “material support” provided to terrorist 
organizations, also part of TRIG. Though the material support provision has existed in the INA 
since 1990, the Real ID Act of 2005 made the provision stricter by relaxing the mens rea 
requirement and limiting waiver availability for individuals providing material support to 
terrorist organizations.29 The more stringent material support bar of the Real ID Act, in 
combination with the additional definitions of terrorist organization from the USA PATRIOT 
Act, begets a much greater number of individuals considered inadmissible for material support, 
                                                 
27
 Kidane, Won. (2010.)  “The Terrorism Bar to Asylum in Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and the United 
States: Transporting Best Practices.” Fordham International Law Journal. Vol. 33: 320.  
28
 9 Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM) 40.32 N5 
29
 Fleming, Mark, Emi McLean and Amanda Taub, eds. (2006) “Unintended Consequences: Refugee Victims of the 
War on Terror.” Georgetown University Law Center Human Rights Institute Refugee Fact-Finding Mission. May 
2006. 
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as the bar itself becomes less forgiving and the number of organizations to which it applies 
expands.  
 The material support provision, under the INA’s definition of “engagement in terrorist 
activity,” reads “to commit an act that the actor knows, or reasonably should know, affords 
material support, including a safe house, transportation, communications, funds, transfer of funds 
or other material financial benefit, false documentation or identification, weapons (including 
chemical, biological, or radiological weapons), explosives, or training…”30 to a terrorist activity 
or organization. (The material support provision is directly connected to the Tier III provision, as 
it is subclause (VI) of “the activities described in subclauses (I) through (VI) of (iv)”31 in which 
Tier III groups take part.) Notably, this is not an exhaustive list of types of material support for 
which an individual can be considered inadmissible. It is merely a list of examples which may be 
considered material support.  
Additionally, the Real ID Act instituted language requiring that an individual be able to 
demonstrate by “clear and convincing evidence that he did not know, or should not reasonably 
have known that the organization [for which he was soliciting funds, things of value, or 
individuals] was a terrorist organization.”32 The addition of “clear and convincing evidence” 
places the burden of proving non-involvement on the applicant. Immediately following the 
material support clause in the INA is a written exception to the material support bar which allows 
the Attorney General or the Secretary of State, in consultation with one another, to determine the 
                                                 
30
 Immigration and Nationality Act. 8 U.S.C. 1182 §212(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI). 
31
 Immigration and Nationality Act. 8 U.S.C. 1182 §212 (a)(3)(B)(vi)(III). 
32
 Real ID Act of 2005. Pub. L 109-13, 119 Stat. 302 §103. 
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material support clause inapplicable to an alien. This exception authority is, in effect, a 
foreshadowing of the subsequent establishment of waiver authority.33  
Importantly, there are several more solidified and authoritative exemption/waiver 
authorities which developed after the 2005 adjustments to the INA. These enable U.S. 
government authorities to determine the inadmissibility inapplicable in certain cases—generally 
when a ‘totality of the circumstances’ warrants such a determination. When the 
exemptions/waivers are for entire groups, they are called “categorical, and when they are 
exercised for an individual they are referred to as “individual” waivers and exemptions. The 
authorities are currently: the authority to waive the TRIG statutes’ invocation or to exempt 
individuals from many of the TRIG provisions (individual), the authority to exempt entire groups 
from the Tier III provision (categorical), and the authority to waive the material support 
provision or to exempt individuals providing material support to certain organizations and 
individuals engaged in terrorist activity (categorical or individual).34 In the following explanation 
and subsequent analysis, “waiver authority” will refer to the ability to admit an individual or 
group for whom the Tier III and related provisions apply. “Exemption authority” will refer to the 
authority to determine the bar inapplicable in a particular case.35 This is consistent with 
convention. 
Individual waivers are requested and obtained during immigration processing either 
during the application or immigration court proceedings, and must be requested from DHS. 
Categorical waivers are generally developed through an interagency process to determine the bar 
                                                 
33
 Georgetown University Law Center Human Rights Institute’s 2006 Refugee Fact-Finding Investigation considers 
this provision “impracticable,” which could explain the question of the redundancy in the production of a material 
support exemption/waiver authority. 
34
 9 FAM 40.32 N5; United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. 2006. “Material Support” and Related Bars 
to Refugee Protection: Summary of Key Provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). 
http://www.rcusa.org/uploads/pdfs/ms-summ-unhcrkeyprov12-06.pdf (March 30, 2011) : 4. 
35
 According to the Foreign Affairs Manual, the “exemption authority” is distinct from the “waiver authority” by 
way of the waiver authority’s applicability to Non-immigrant Visa cases. 
McCarthy 21 
 
inapplicable to the particular group which has been labeled Tier III in individuals’ immigration 
cases. Exemptions are similarly issued through interagency consultation to determine in which 
cases the particular bar is inapplicable, and thus is in some ways are more amendable to 
categorical issuance. Subsequent to the institution of a waiver/exemption, individuals formerly 
inadmissible by TRIG authority are no longer barred if they meet the statutory requirements of 
the exemption. The following is a description of the evolution of the current waiver/exemption 
authority. 
In 2008, the Consolidated Appropriations Act (CAA, Pub. L. 110-161) expanded the 
waiver authority, contained in §212(d)(3)(B)(i), to enable the Secretaries of State or Homeland 
Security to waive the application of the Tier III inadmissibility to entire groups and individuals 
associated with the group or groups’ supposed terrorist activity.36 Thus §691(A) of the CAA 
reads:  
The Secretary of State, after consultation with the Attorney General and the Secretary of 
Homeland Security, or the Secretary of Homeland Security, after consultation with the 
Secretary of State and the Attorney General, may determine in such Secretary's sole 
unreviewable discretion that subsection (a)(3)(B) shall not apply with respect to an alien 
within the scope of that subsection or that subsection (a)(3)(B)(vi)(III) shall not apply to a 
group within the scope of that subsection…37 
 
The provision also does not apply to an individual who has  
voluntarily and knowingly engaged in or endorsed or espoused or persuaded others to 
endorse or espouse or support terrorist activity on behalf of, or has voluntarily and 
knowingly received military-type training from a terrorist organization that is described 
in subclause (I) or (II) of subsection (a)(3)(B)(vi), and no such waiver may be extended to 
a group that has engaged terrorist activity against the United States or another democratic 
country or that has purposefully engaged in a pattern or practice of terrorist activity that 
is directed at civilians.38 
 
                                                 
36
 Garcia, Michael John and Ruth Ellen Wasem. 2010. Immigration: Terrorist Grounds for Exclusion and Removal 
of Aliens. (January 12.) Congressional Research Service.  
37
 Consolidated Appropriations Act Pub. L. 110-161, 121 Stat. 1844 §691. 
38
 Ibid. 
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 §691(B) of the CAA is the utilization of this waiver authority. It applies automatic relief 
of the §212(a)(3)(B), terrorist organization inadmissibility provisions for “the Hmong and other 
groups that do not pose a threat to the United States,” saying: 
For purposes of section 212(a)(3)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 
1182(a)(3)(B)), the Karen National Union/Karen Liberation Army (KNU/KNLA), the 
Chin National Front/Chin National Army (CNF/CNA), the Chin National League for 
Democracy (CNLD), the Kayan New Land Party (KNLP), the Arakan Liberation Party 
(ALP), the Mustangs, the Alzados, the Karenni National Progressive Party, and 
appropriate groups affiliated with the Hmong and the Montagnards shall not be 
considered to be a terrorist organization on the basis of any act or event occurring before 
the date of enactment of this section.39 
 
 The CAA thus had several basic effects: it granted eligibility to groups previously 
inadmissible, including members and representatives of Tier III terrorist organizations, persons 
who have engaged in terrorist activities of Tier III groups, and persons who may have engaged in 
terrorist activity unknowingly. The CAA waiver authority is categorical, as it makes entire 
groups eligible for relief from the Tier III inadmissibility.40  
Official exemptions were published in the Federal Register on June 18, 2008 for each of 
the ten groups included in §691(B).41 The individuals covered by the Federal Register 
exemptions and applying for immigration status must also be able to prove to the authority 
adjudicating their case that  
the alien (a) Is seeking a benefit or protection under the INA and has been determined to 
be otherwise eligible for the benefit or protection; (b) has undergone and passed relevant 
background and security checks; (c) has fully disclosed, in all relevant applications and 
interviews with U.S. government representatives and agents, the nature and 
circumstances of each activity or association falling within the scope of section 
212(a)(3)(B) of the INA; (d) poses no danger to the safety and security of the United 
                                                 
39
 Ibid. 
40
 Garcia, Michael John and Ruth Ellen Wasem. 2010. Immigration: Terrorist Grounds for Exclusion and Removal 
of Aliens. (January 12.) Congressional Research Service. 
41
 Exercise of Authority Under Sec. 212 (d)(3)(B)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act 73 Fed Reg 118 (June 
18, 2008). 
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States; and (e) is warranted to be exempted from the relevant inadmissibility provision by 
the totality of the circumstances.42 
 
 Public Law 110-257 amended §691(B) of the CAA to include the ANC, exonerating any 
“alien with respect to activities undertaken in association with the African National Congress in 
opposition to apartheid rule in South Africa”43 from the Tier III provision. It specifically urged 
the Secretaries of State and Homeland Security to immediately take any action necessary “to 
exempt the anti-apartheid activities of aliens who are current or former officials of the 
Government of the Republic of South Africa [from the definition of “terrorist organization” in 
§212(a)(3)(B) of the INA].”44  
Discussions for further categorical waivers and exemptions continue. Similar to the 
contentious debates over the barring of the ANC officials under Tier III, heated discussions 
concerning the finding of Tier III inadmissibility for several Iraqi groups have developed in the 
academic and policy communities. In 2009, the exemption authority was exercised to excuse the 
Iraqi National Congress, the Kurdistan Democratic Party, and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan 
from the provisions of §212 (a)(3)(B).45 As recently as December 2010, DHS Secretary Janet 
Napolitano exercised her authority to exempt the All Burma Students’ Democratic Front for 
qualification as a Tier III, undesignated terrorist organization.46   
 There is also an exemption authority for waiving the material support bar in INA §212 
(d)(3)(B)(i), which was available prior to the Consolidated Appropriations Act. In 2006, this 
authority was exercised by Secretary of State Rice with regards to three groups of refugees: 
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 Exercise of Authority Under Sec. 212 (d)(3)(B)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act 73 Fed Reg 118 (June 
18, 2008). 
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 Exemption of African National Congress from Treatment as Terrorist Organization for Certain Acts or Events 
Public. Pub. L. 110-257, 122 Stat. 2426. 
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 Ibid. 
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 Refugee Council USA. (2004-2011) “Refugee Waivers.” Accessed April 2, 2011 
<http://www.rcusa.org/index.php?page=refugee-waivers>. 
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“Burmese Karen individuals who had provided material support to the Karen National Union 
(KNU) or Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), and for Chin Burmese refugees who 
provided material support to the CNF or Chin National Army (CNA).”47 The authority was also 
exercised in 2007 to produce a waiver for material support provided to the following Tier III 
organizations: the Karen National Union/Karen National Liberation Army (KNU/KNLA), the 
Chin National Front/Chin National Army (CNF/CNA), the Chin National League for Democracy 
(CNLD), the Kayan New Land Party (KNLP), the Arakan Liberation Party (ALP), the Tibetan 
Mustangs, the Cuban Alzados, or the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP).48 
 Also in 2007, working off the previous waivers of material support, Secretary of 
Homeland Security Chertoff “exercised his authority to waive the material support 
inadmissibility bar for certain aliens if the material support was provided under duress to an 
undesignated terrorist organization and the totality of the circumstances justified the favorable 
exercise of discretion, thus recognizing a new ‘duress exemption.’”49 Initially unavailable to 
individuals providing material support under duress to Tier I or II organizations,50 late in 2007 
Secretary Chertoff exercised this authority in regards to material support provided to the 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia 
(AUC), and the National Liberation Army of Colombia (ELN),51 all Tier I terrorist organizations. 
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Finally, a waiver authority exists for persons placed in removal proceedings after the 
finding of material support to a Tier III terrorist organization, though it is not specific to the 
TRIG bars. The authority for exercising such rests solely with the Secretary of Homeland 
Security,52 and is delineated in the INA §240.53   
In summary, this brief overview of the evolution of the Tier III inadmissibility provisions 
considered the INA’s definition of an undesignated terrorist organization and the effect of the 
material support bar. The overview also covered the currently available, discretionary 
exemptions and waivers, which represent ad hoc remedies in cases where the inadmissibility is 
determined to be inapplicable for political, moral or other reasons. This overview of the INA’s 
relevant TRIG provisions, in conjunction with the conventional definitions of terrorism discussed 
previously, will enable us to better understand the criticisms of the legislation and ultimately to 
recognize the value or lack thereof of proposed modifications to it. 
 
  
                                                 
52
 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. 2006. “Material Support” and Related Bars to Refugee 
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IV. Approach to Reviewing Proposals 
 
 Despite their recent emergence, the TRIG provisions have already come under harsh 
criticism in the international, academic, and policy communities. As a result, a proliferation of 
proposed changes to the legislation ranging from slight to drastic has developed. This research 
aims to centralize the discussion of these proposed changes. Where proposals are generally made 
as part of a discussion of a specific flaw of the Tier III and related inadmissibility provisions,  
and are made without much discussion of the proposals’ effects, this project will bring together 
the array of proposals and evaluate their impact against common criteria—an approach yet to be 
undertaken by those recommending them. The proposed changes to the legislation to be explored 
here are: 
1. No modification to the application of Tier III, nor to the current process of adjudicating 
cases and waiver issuance. 
2. Modification of the exemption/waiver processes via expanded categories or authority for 
issuing of exemptions/waivers. 
3. Creation of a de minimis level of material support or of a more restricted definition of 
material support to terrorist organizations.  
4. Creation of an exception for material support provided under duress. 
5. Introduction of the elements of “intent” and/or representation of a threat to national 
security into the Tier III provision.  
6. Do not apply the Tier III provision retroactively, that is to groups which have given up 
terrorist activities or for activities which ceased prior to the enactment of the relevant 
legislation. 
7. Introduction of a “designated” list of Tier III terrorist organizations. 
8. Removal of the Tier III provision. 
The proposals are considered in the order of least to most change to the statutory language of the 
Tier III inadmissibility in the INA. This is not a measure of impact, but merely reflects the 
method of change to the TRIG bars which the proposals entail.54  
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 The proposals are arranged in order of no change, to interpretive changes or changes which affect the 
implementation of the TRIG provisions but not the language of 212(a(3)(B), to changes directly affecting the 
statutory language in the INA. This is synonymous with “implementation,” as considered in this project. 
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The following analysis evaluates each of the proposals according to an 
“adoptionimplementationimpact” framework. Such a framework is useful as it allows us to 
differentiate between various elements of the proposed legislation: how the content of a proposal 
effects the current state of the legislation (impact), in what form the legislation should/would 
necessarily occur to generate this effect (implementation), and whether or not the proposal itself 
is viable in the current policy community (adoption). Thus for each proposal, this analysis will 
consider whether the legislation is likely to be adopted, how it would be implemented, and what 
would be the impact of its enactment. Specifically, this research will proceed with a two-pronged 
approach, considering the framework above in reverse order, and grouping together 
“implementation” and “impact” in Section V Part C, and considering adoptability in Section V 
Part D. 
 Section V Part A and Part B establish the criteria against which the proposals will be 
evaluated. In Part A the research first gleans, from existing literature and public comment, the 
primary criticisms of the legislation to use as a backdrop for considering the proposals’ potential 
impact. These are: over-breadth of the definition of a Tier III terrorist organization, effective bars 
to refugee and asylum seekers, and an administrative backlog of immigration cases. Given that 
proposals are made in an effort to effect one criticism or another, comparative evaluation of the 
proposals’ ability to alleviate these alleged inadequacies is an appropriate starting point for this 
project. Section V Part B develops a rating scheme for the proposals in terms of their impact on 
each of the three criticisms. This allows the proposals to be more easily compared to one another, 
and more cleanly interpreted by advocating/opposing parties. 
Section V Parts C and D make up the substantive analysis of the proposals. Part C 
analyzes the potential impact (of the “adoptionimplementationimpact” framework) of each 
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of the proposals against the criticisms explored in Part A and using the rating scheme developed 
in Part B. For each proposal, Part C will consider firstly the content and reasoning of the 
proposal. It will then proceed to consider the potential effects of the proposed changes with 
respect to their ability to ameliorate the criticisms of the legislation.55 Part C’s analysis of the 
potential impact of the proposals constitutes the bulk of this analysis. The theoretical analysis is 
based on this project’s consideration of the proposals, and is to some degree subject to 
interpretation. For each proposal, the potential impact will be considered based on the content of 
the proposal as compared to the current state of the Tier III and related provisions. 
Understanding the effects of Tier III currently (here considered in the form of the three key 
criticisms) as well as the changes to the content of Tier III by each proposal will allow us to 
extrapolate the effects of the proposals with regard to those three criticisms. This projects 
comparison of the proposals’ impact is ultimately the most valuable contribution of this project 
to the literature. 
Part C will also explain the implementation of the proposals, or step two in the 
“adoptionimplementationimpact” framework. Implied by each proposal is a 
recommendation for a certain type of implementation: amendment to the legislation, directive of 
a principal, or creation of additional authority for an agency/principal (indeed this is the 
determinant of the order in which the proposals are explored). This recommendation is either 
implicit or explicit, but nonetheless intrinsic to the proposal as considered here. Certainly, if the 
policy proposal were to be made in the end, a far more detailed analysis of the strategy for 
implementation would be necessary. The official recommendation would have to consider in far 
greater depth how the change would be enacted: through what type of legislation, advanced by 
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which agencies, supported by which budgets and processes, etc. Such is not the goal of this 
analysis, which operates with a much more limited understanding of “implementation,” but 
would be valuable in further study and would be vital to actual policy development.  
Part D of the analysis of the proposed changes will consider the “adoption” piece of the 
“adoptionimplementationimpact” framework. Adoptability is considered to mean the 
potential for realization of the proposal, given its potential impact explored in Part C, in the 
context of the opinions of policymakers, agency officials, and other parties with a stake in the 
enactment of changes. The task of Part D is to isolate the opinions of policymakers, bureaucrats, 
and legislators which can feasibly lead us to believe that they would or would not support a 
certain proposal given its potential impact on the legislation. Part D complements Part C’s 
analysis. It grounds the acceptability of proposals in the wider policy community (not just those 
recommending the change) and should narrow the number of proposals which would be viable 
for recommendation. 
Part D will utilize testimony from Senate Judiciary Committee hearings during the 110th 
and 111th Congresses.56 The Senate Judiciary Committee hearings are used because this 
committee has jurisdiction over both the Departments of Homeland Security and Justice as well 
as over the issue of immigration. These transcripts are the most pertinent, official discussions of 
the Tier III and related inadmissibility issues which are publically available. The statements 
available are limited (for the purposes of this discussion) in that they center primarily on the 
issue of effective bars to refugee and asylum seekers, or Criticism 2, via the material support bar 
and the waiver and exemption authority. Thus the discussion in Part D is limited in its ability to 
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McCarthy 30 
 
narrow the acceptability of proposals, but provides a useful set of counterpoints to the criticisms 
and the proposals’ suggestions unexplored prior to that point. 
Of course, a separate analysis of Congressional and agency/principals’ dispositions 
toward certain proposals would be necessary to fully account for a proposal’s potential to be 
adopted at any given time. However, this analysis will only consider the favorability of the 
proposals based on the official testimonies most closely considering the issue thus far. Future 
research might tackle the monumental task of gathering comprehensive statements by individual 
Congresspersons and principals (or those directly responsible for enacting changes to the 
legislation) to determine which proposals could be adopted under which administration and 
Congress.  
Finally, Section VI will advance a recommendation for which of the eight proposals 
would be the most pertinent to pursue at this time given the proposals’ potential impact and its 
adoptability. Such a recommendation will have to take account of both the potential impact of 
the proposal as well as adoptability, and could feasibly be a combination of proposals. The 
recommendation should consider the inherent tension between the desire on the part of Federal 
agencies to maintain discretionary authority and the desire on the part of advocates for change to 
alter the TRIG statutes in such a way that prevent unjust application of the provisions.  Thus it is 
appropriate to conjecture that the proposals which “score the best” in Part A’s impact analysis 
would not necessarily prove to be the most adoptable in Part B, given that these are the proposals 
which entail the greatest limitations to the statutory authority accorded by the legislation. If one 
exists, a proposal which alleviates some of the criticisms (preferably all) but allows significant 
(perhaps little changed) discretionary authority by relevant agencies would be more likely to be 
adopted, as such a proposal would garner support from members of Congress and civil society 
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interested in limiting the detrimental effects alleged of the legislation thus far, but would to allow 
the agencies utilizing the legislation to do so with continued discretionary authority by field 
experts.  
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V. Analysis of the Proposals 
 
A. The Primary Criticisms 
 
This section will explore the main criticisms of the Tier III inadmissibility, or those 
criticisms which are most widely noted in the academic and policy communities. These are: 1) 
the over-breadth of the Tier III definition of an undesignated terrorist organization, 2) the 
imposition of effective bars to refugees and asylum seekers, and 3) the bureaucratic backlog of 
immigration cases. While Criticism 1 is fundamental to Criticisms 2 and 3, Criticisms 2 and 3 are 
separated from 1 as they are often referenced as distinct issues in the literature, and are 
separately the basis for various recommendations made by the same literature. Criticisms 1 and 2 
are “substantive” criticisms of the legislation—that is they take issue with the language and use 
of the provisions themselves. Criticism 3 is critical of the administrative results of the Tier III 
and terrorism-related inadmissibility provisions. 
Criticism 1: Over-breadth of the Tier III Definition of a Terrorist Organization 
 
The fundamental, over-arching complaint pertaining to the TRIG provisions is that the 
Tier III inadmissibility net is too broad—that it bars too many individuals and organizations who 
do not meet conventional standards of terrorism. The Tier III provision defines an undesignated 
terrorist organization as “a group of two or more individuals, whether organized or not, which 
engages in, or has a subgroup which engages in, the [terrorist] activities described in subclauses 
(I) through (VI) of clause (iv).”57 This definition, in comparison to the academic, international, 
and even agency definitions of terrorism explored previously, is much broader. For example, it 
does not contain elements of premeditation, motive/ideological objective, or desired effects. 
Where U.S. Federal agency definitions require that the terrorist act be undertaken to influence or 
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to damage, the Tier III provision has no such requirement. Where international definitions focus 
on the intentional nature of the activity and academic definitions require political violence and/or 
effects beyond the immediate victims, the Tier III definition is not similarly limiting. 
Kidane (2010) explains that the counterterrorism immigration policy and procedure 
adopted by the U.S. after 9/11—specifically the Tier III provision—is unique within his cross-
jurisdictional study in not requiring a link between the denial of entry and a threat to national 
security. He argues further that because the scope of terrorist activity under the Tier III 
inadmissibility is so broad, and because Tier III is not subject to the same kind of public scrutiny 
as a terrorist designation list (as is produced by Tiers I and II and by other jurisdictions in his 
study), it generates unacceptable results—denying persons from Nelson Mandela to legal 
officials assisting U.S. forces in Iraq.58 
Stock (2010) is particularly critical of the extreme nature of Tier III inadmissibility 
provision of the INA, by which she argues, “the United States could deny visas…to any 
foreigners ever involved in a knife fight in a bar.”59 Stock argued the result of this overbroad 
policy was an illogical system of national security-minded immigration policy.60 In considering 
this definitional over-stretch, Human Rights First (HRF) compiled a list of organizations which 
are classed as Tier III terrorist organizations, but which are not considered terrorist organizations 
by the U.S. government in any other context. These include:  
• All Iraqis, and Iraqi groups, which rose up against Saddam Hussein in the 
1990’s…; 
• All Iraqis, and Iraqi groups, that later fought against Saddam Hussein’s armies in 
conjunction with the Coalition forces that ultimately overthrew his regime in 2003;  
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• All of the Afghan mujahidin groups that fought the Soviet invasion in the 1980’s, 
with U.S. support;  
• The Democratic Unionist Party and the Ummah Party, two of the largest 
democratic opposition parties in Sudan, many of whose members were forced to 
flee the country in the years after the 1989 military coup that brought current 
President Omar Al-Bashir to power; 
• The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/SPLA), the South 
Sudanese armed opposition movement that after years of civil war in pursuit of 
southern self-determination is now the ruling party of an autonomous Government 
of South Sudan; 
• Virtually all Ethiopian and Eritrean political parties and movements, past and 
present; 
• Every group ever to have fought the ruling military junta in Burma that was not 
included in the legislation that removed the Chin National Front and others from 
the scope of the Tier III definition; 
• Any group that has used armed force against the regime in Iran since the 1979 
revolution; 
• The Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), the main political opposition to 
President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe.61 
 
Some maintain that the fervent reaction to 9/11 by Congress in the form of the USA 
PATRIOT Act resulted in hurried legislation inconsistent with the U.S.’s moral and 
constitutional duties, as well as to international norms and laws, inclusive of the Tier III 
definition of a terrorist organization. Still others would argue that such criticism, based on the 
climate in which the legislation was passed, is irrelevant to the equity and effectiveness of the 
legislation. 
Criticism 2: Effective Bars to Refugees and Asylum Seekers 
The effective bars to refugees and asylum seekers arising from the Tier III inadmissibility 
come mainly through the material support provision’s connection to the Tier III inadmissibility. 
Without the Tier III definition of a terrorist organization, the material support bar would apply to 
a far smaller group of people—that is, only to people supplying material support to Foreign 
Terrorist Organizations or one of the organizations on the Terrorist Exclusion List. The argument 
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in regards to refugees and asylum seekers is that persons fleeing persecution are among the 
larger number of persons (sometimes disproportionately so) unfairly caught in the TRIG net by 
virtue of having provided material support to Tier III terrorist organizations—specifically 
support provided under duress, inadvertently, or at an insignificant level.  
The criticism has been explored by such groups as Human Rights First (HRF) and the 
Georgetown University Law Center’s Human Rights Institute, who have focused on the material 
support bars’ effect on refugees and asylum seekers in the U.S. HRF’s report highlights several 
controversial ways in which the material support bar is currently being used to deny refugees and 
asylum seekers immigration privileges to the U.S., including the denial of persons for material 
support provided under duress or for small/insignificant amounts of material support.62 The 2006 
report entitled “Unintended Consequences” from Georgetown University Law Center Human 
Rights Institute’s Refugee Fact-Finding Investigation details several cases in which the material 
support bar has been interpreted to bar refugees. In the case of Arias v. Gonzalez, a farmer who 
paid his employer’s “vacuna”63 to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) was 
deemed inadmissible on the grounds that the vacuna constituted material support to the FARC. 
Furthermore, among the most controversial ways in which the material support bar is 
applied to refugees and asylum seekers is via the imposition of inadmissibility on the basis of the 
individual’s inadvertent provision of material support to members of Tier III (or other) terrorist 
organizations. Georgetown University Law Center’s report finds that in 24% of cases it studied 
in which Tier III inadmissibility from material support was enacted, the support to a terrorist 
                                                 
62
 Ibid,  6. 
63
 “Vacuna”, literally translated to “vaccine”, is the equivalent of an involuntary tax paid to the gang/party/war 
lord/guerrilla in charge with the understanding that if it is not paid, harm to the delinquent is expected. 
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organization was unintentional.64 Barrett Duke of the Southern Baptist Convention notes that the 
material support provision has barred doctors for their aid to wounded terrorists, at times without 
the knowledge that their patient was a terrorist at all.65 
Even more controversially, immigrants may be denied admissibility even after direct 
support of the U.S. government, and/or despite tacit U.S. acceptance of the material support. 
Husarska (2008) tells the story of Saman Kareem Ahmad, an Iraqi Kurd who worked with the 
U.S. marines and was subsequently denied asylum in the U.S. on the basis of his previous 
involvement with a group which fought against Saddam Hussein’s government.66  
It has also been argued that the current use of waiver authority for the material support 
provision, which could feasibly relieve some/all deserving refugee and asylum cases of the 
material support bar, is inadequate both in the extent of its use thus far and the speed at which it 
can be enacted in a particular case. Especially in cases where refugees have lived in the U.S. for 
years and been granted refugee status, Senior Director at the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society 
Melanie Nezer argues that the process for clearing cases of the Tier III inadmissibility needs to 
be faster.67  
While this project will only consider the material support bar in its analysis of effective 
bars to refugees and asylum seekers, there are additional TRIG barriers to refugees and asylum 
seekers. For instance, groups which may be found inadmissible under Tier III statute likely will 
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not be considered for the U.S. State Department’s determination of prioritization for refugee-
group resettlement, including some who ‘“pose no apparent national security risk and to whom 
the U.S. is sympathetic.”’68  
Several authors argue that there are already mechanisms in both U.S. immigration and 
refugee law, as well as international refugee law, which provide means to deny immigration 
privileges to refugees and asylum seekers who represent a security threat to the U.S. Thus the use 
of TRIG in refugee and asylum cases is redundant and unnecessary. HRF’s report enumerates a 
number of situations under which refugees and asylum seekers posing a security risk to the U.S. 
may be denied immigration privileges, apart from the Tier III provision, including: individuals 
who are believed to be entering the U.S. to engage in unlawful activity, whose entry would have 
adverse foreign policy consequences, who have ties to totalitarian entities or past involvement in 
genocide, torture, or extrajudicial killings, or who have engaged in terrorist activity or are 
representative of a terrorist organization.69 Feller (2006) similarly explains that the Refugee 
Convention of 1951 provides adequate tools for distinguishing between terrorists and legitimate 
refugees, and for denying terrorists refugee privileges.70 Feller argues that as a result of the 
increasingly felt need to protect the refugee and asylum system from abuse and national security 
threats, refugees and asylum seekers are mischaracterized as criminals, terrorists and as 
illegitimate migrants attempting to “cheat the system.” This mischaracterization, to which the 
Tier III and material support provisions have contributed, is fundamentally undermining the 
protection the refugee and asylum systems are meant to provide.71 
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undesignated terrorist organization. The second, outermost ring represents the individuals barred 
by material support to those Tier III organizations. It is proportional in size to the inner circle, as 
the greater number of terrorist organizations considered to be
individuals providing material support to people/organizations considered Tier III and the greater 
number of those individuals inadmissible under the material support provision. 
expands with an increased number of Tier III inadmissibility findings, the outer circle expands 
accordingly.72 The proposals then
limit the number of people barred by the Tier III and material support provisions
the sizes of the inner or outer circles, or both. 
Criticism 3: Administrative Backlog of Immigration 
 The final major criticism of the current state of the 
provisions is the allegedly unnecessary, inequitable, and at times crippling 
U.S. immigration proceedings. The backlog developed after the 2001 enactment of the USA 
PATRIOT Act and the 2005 enactment of the REAL ID Act primarily because of the large 
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number of Tier III and material support inadmissibility cases that resulted from the expansion of 
TRIG provisions. Critics argue that adequate administrative procedures—to deal with the 
increased number of cases and to perform the appropriate review by Federal agencies and 
judiciaries—were poorly developed. As a result, cases wait too long in immigration proceedings 
related to Tier III inadmissibility to determine either final inadmissibility and removal, or 
whether a waiver is available, applicable, and appropriate. 
Several aspects of the legislation and the process for handling a Tier III determination 
may be considered to have contributed to the case backlog, including the general scope of the 
TRIG provisions and the requirement that a determination of waiver eligibility comes only at the 
decision of a principal. 
HRF’s report argues specifically that the piecemeal approach to dealing with the 
enactment of the Tier III and related provisions in immigration cases results in the unnecessary 
consumption of high-level government officials’ time and in delayed adjudications resulting in 
prolonged detentions and separation of families.73 The report specifically cites the waiver 
process for Tier III cases in contributing to the case backlog, and describes the flaws in the 
immigration court waiver process: 
(1) it does not provide for waiver consideration until the applicant has already been 
ordered deported and that order is considered administratively “final,” resulting in years 
of unnecessary delay and, in some cases, prolonged detention, as well as significant 
expense to the government; (2) it does not apply to the unknown number of cases denied 
based on the “terrorism bars” between October 2001 and September 2008, unless and 
until the applicant is detained; (3) it provides no protection against actual deportation for 
people for whom the Department of Homeland Security has not yet implemented 
waivers—individuals in this situation whose applications for asylum are being 
adjudicated by the Department of Homeland Security are placed “on hold” pending 
waiver implementation, but those whose applications for asylum are adjudicated by the 
immigration courts are not. These defects are having a serious impact on asylum 
applicants whose cases have been before the immigration courts. 
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 This project will not explore the complex processes for adjudicating TRIG cases, though 
many questions do exist as to the appropriateness of certain courts and detention processes. The 
analysis of the proposals’ effects on this particular criticism of the TRIG statutes will consider 
only whether the institution of the proposal will affect 1) the number of cases in proceedings and 
2) the speed of the process—which is considered to involve only the extent of review a case 
requires (e.g. to obtain a waiver) and not idiosyncratic issues which cause certain cases to take 
greater or less time than others.  
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B. Classification Scheme for Comparing the Proposals’ Impact  
The following classification scheme will address the impact of each of the proposals on 
the above three criticisms. Because it is the criticisms which led to the proposition of changes to 
the INA’s TRIG statutes, it is the criticisms which are the most appropriate standards by which 
to judge the potential impact of the proposals.  
The rating scheme developed here will assign a label to each proposal for each 
criticism—thus each proposal will have three classifications which are then comparable to one 
another. These classifications, proposed below, will not be based upon a subjective valuation of 
the criticisms or the merits of the proposal, but will as objectively as possible address whether or 
not the criticisms are assuaged by the proposed changes.  
Criticism 1 
Given that the primary criticism of the legislation is that the Tier III definition of a 
terrorist organization is philosophically too broad, the proposals should principally aim to narrow 
the definition. The definition could be a narrowed directly (by a change to INA §212 
(a)(3)(B)(vi)(III)) or indirectly (vis-à-vis a change to another provision such as the material 
support bar which limits the scope of the Tier III statute). It is important to acknowledge that it is 
possible to reduce the number of Tier III determinations in several ways, but this project’s 
classification of a proposal’s impact with regard to Criticism 1 is concerned only with the 
proposal’s systematic impact on the definition of a Tier III organization, and not simply on a 
reduction in number of Tier III cases. This research regards “systematic impact” as a change 
which limits the definition or extent of the Tier III provision in any case regardless of affiliation 
with certain terrorist organizations or other distinctive attributes which apply only to certain 
groups, such as the date of the activity of material support provided to a specific organization. In 
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this view, only changes which alter the “philosophy” of the Tier III definition and related 
provisions—the definitional breadth—qualify as direct or indirect changes to the provision. 
It is intuitive to assume that a direct modification would have a greater overall impact 
because it reduces the breadth of the definition of a terrorist organization and thus also limits the 
numbers of people potentially barred by material support to that organization. However, it is not 
necessary that a direct impact on Criticism 1 have a greater impact in terms of the absolute 
number of cases relieved of the TRIG bars.  
It is further possible that a proposal will have no impact on the scope of the Tier III 
definition, or that a proposal could broaden the definition of an undesignated terrorist 
organization, though given that the proposals are generally made in light of alleged criticisms, 
the later situation should be rare if nonexistent. Therefore, for every proposal we will assign a 
one-word label for its affect on the Tier III provision: direct, indirect, unchanged, or broadened.  
Along a continuum of how much change this would entail, we could configure a scheme such as 
the one in Figure 2. 
Fig. 2 
 
Criticism 2 
Any proposed modification to the legislation will also necessarily have to consider its 
affect on refugees and asylum seekers. Because Criticism 2 is that refugees and asylum seekers 
are inadvertently and unfairly barred by the Tier III legislation (or that the use of Tier III in 
barring refugees is redundant to other provisions of U.S. and international refugee law), the 
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proposals should be aimed at limiting the number of refugees and asylum seekers barred 
inadvertently/unfairly by the TRIG provisions. Therefore, this analysis will consider ways in 
which proposals limit the scope of the material support bar (the clause most intimately affecting 
the refugee and asylum seeking populations) to determine the impact on Criticism 2. We can also 
predict, using Figure 1, that limiting changes to the Tier III provision will limit the number of 
refugees barred by the material support provision, because material support provided to fewer 
organizations would be inadmissible.  
A proposal which limits the material support provision will be classified as a direct 
limitation of the effective bars to refugee and asylum seekers, and a proposal limiting the 
definition of a terrorist organization will be classified as an indirect limitation. It is possible that 
no change will be made by a proposal to the effective bars to refugee or asylum via the Tier III or 
material support provisions or that a proposal would broaden the effective bars to refugees and 
asylum seekers. Thus for this category each proposal will be classified as: direct, indirect, 
unchanged, or broadened. The continuum depicted in Figure 2, above, is applicable as a frame of 
reference here as well. 
Criticism 3 
This project will finally consider the effects on the administrative backlog of a proposal, 
as compared to the administrative backlog resulting from the 2001 and 2005 adjustments to the 
INA’s TRIG provisions. Because this project does not consider the process of adjudication of 
claims and other issues which are related to this administrative backlog, but merely notes the 
channels through which the backlog is produced, the analysis of the proposals’ impact will be 
correspondingly surface-level. This is because it is impossible to predict, especially without an 
exact plan for implementation, what bureaucratic and paperwork channels will be utilized. It 
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would not be unreasonable to say that the enactment of any legislation would temporarily, in the 
long- or short-run, increase case build-up as the implementation processes are established. 
(Indeed this is one argument that could be made to defend the case build-up as a result of the 
Tier III and related legislation.) Similarly, one does not know how any proposal would affect the 
existing case backlog. Because even if one knows whether the proposal changes an aspect of the 
legislation which currently effects the buildup of cases, one does not know what methods the 
courts and federal agencies will use to addresses cases theoretically affected by the proposal that 
are already in immigration proceedings. However, one may hypothesize whether the proposals 
will lessen the number of cases in immigration proceedings in the future based on what has 
contributed to the current backlog of cases. This analysis will disregard short-run effects of 
newly enacted legislation on bureaucratic process, and will consider only 1) whether the number 
of cases in immigration proceedings would be less if the proposal were currently in effect and 2) 
whether the proposal will entail changes in court/administrative review (e.g. for a waiver or 
principals’ judgment). Thus for each proposal this analysis will conclude that the case backlog 
has been reduced, unchanged, or exacerbated, based on the proposal’s effect on the number of 
cases to be barred by Tier III and related provisions and on the requirements for review of the 
cases for which the provisions apply.  
In some ways this measure is redundant to the evaluation of the above criticisms because 
of the measure of “number of cases” in immigration proceedings. Ultimately, because the 
primary criticism is that the Tier III net is too broad, each of the criticisms is focused in some 
way on how “too many” cases of Tier III exist.  However, it is an important consideration in and 
of itself, as the other classifications of proposals are more so an evaluation of the substance of 
the proposal and only indirectly consider the number of Tier III inadmissibility cases. The 
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explicit classification of the effects of a proposal on the administrative backlog is a more discrete 
measure of the effect of a proposal on the institutional immigration infrastructure. 
The Classification Scheme 
 In summary, table V.B.1 is a template for the potential classifications of each proposal. 
Table 
V.B.1 
Criticism 1: 
Over-breadth 
of the Tier III 
Definition of 
a Terrorist 
Organization 
Criticism 2: 
Effective 
Bars to 
Refugee 
and 
Asylum 
Seekers 
Criticism 3: 
Administrative 
Backlog of 
Immigration 
Cases 
"Proposal" 
direct/ 
indirect/ 
unchanged/ 
broadened 
direct/ 
indirect/ 
unchanged/ 
broadened 
reduced/ 
unchanged/ 
exacerbated 
 
Certainly one could level the criticism that such an analysis is not adequately detailed or nuanced 
to evaluate such diverse policy proposals, and one would be partially correct. The goal of this 
classification system is not to wholeheartedly advance one policy suggestion over another on the 
basis of this simple classification. It is designed to create a starting point for analyzing policies 
against one another in a way that has heretofore been neglected by those advancing such 
proposals, and which will be helpful in considering whether changes could or should be made to 
the legislation. In this view, it could be suggested that if the proposals evaluated are consistently 
classed as direct/indirect, direct/indirect, and reduced, respective to criticisms one, two, and 
three, policy changes might be desirable because many diverse policies represent an amelioration 
of criticisms of the legislation, at least in terms of the criticisms evaluated here. Contrastingly, 
consistent scores of broadened/unchanged, broadened/unchanged or exacerbated could indicate 
that changes to the legislation are undesirable or unnecessary, or at least that further proposals 
need to be made.  
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C. Analysis: The Proposals and their Impact 
 
This section will analyze the potential impact (of the “adoptionimplementation 
impact” framework) of each of the proposals with regard to the three primary criticisms explored 
above, utilizing the classification scheme developed in Part B recommended. For each proposal 
the content, reason for recommendation, and method of implementation is explored. This is 
followed by a discussion of whether and how the proposal addresses each of the three criticisms 
in Part A. Each proposal is then assigned three labels according to the classification of the 
proposal’s theoretical impact on each of the criticisms.  
It is worth noting that the evaluation of the proposals’ theoretical impact is contingent on 
the proposals being aimed at true problems. If the problem which the proposal purports to 
address does not exist, then the impact will be similarly fictional, because the initial conditions 
which the impact would “remedy” do not exist. Because of privacy limitations in accessing 
individual cases of Tier III and related inadmissibility, the information which would allow this 
project to determine whether and how often each of the issues delineated by the proposals 
emerge in actual cases is unattainable. Thus this project relies on secondary sources and reports, 
which are often produced by lawyers, case workers and other officials with direct access to 
persons undergoing these cases. 
The eight proposals considered here are so because they are the most commonly 
recommended in the literature (e.g. HRF’s Denial and Delay, Georgetown “Unintended 
Consequences,” etc.) but also because they represent a varied degree of effects on the legislation. 
In the following analysis, some proposals recommended less often but with effects identical to 
proposals explored are also mentioned.  
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1. No modification to the application of Tier III, nor to the current process of adjudicating 
cases and waiver issuance. 
 
In an analysis of policy options, one must always consider the option to do nothing. 
Perhaps more than in a scientific experiment, the “do-nothing” or “control” option is important 
in considering policy alternatives. Policy inertia and bureaucratic hurdles can influence or even 
incentivize the option to continue with the current policy. In the case of Tier III and related TRIG 
provisions, there are many proponents of the legislation as it currently stands. These proponents 
may or may not acknowledge the validity of the criticisms outlined in Part A, but still favor the 
policy as it currently exists in the INA and immigration processes. 
In a 2007 hearing before the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on 
Human Rights and the Law, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Policy at DHS Paul Rosenzweig, 
argues that, “the INA’s broad definitions of terrorist activity and the provision of material 
support to terrorists or terrorist organizations are at the heart of the U.S. government’s ability to 
be proactive in its counter-terrorism efforts.”74 Rosenzweig provides specific examples of 
instances in which the material support bar was successfully wielded by immigration and law 
enforcement officials to bar/deport individuals providing material support to terrorist 
organizations. In one case, an alien from Saudi Arabia who entered the U.S. as a student was 
removed for his assistance running an Al Qaeda front group’s website and for soliciting funding 
for the organization; in another an alien applying to become a legal permanent resident of the 
U.S. was placed in removal proceedings for his involvement in a group which included Al Qaeda 
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associates.75 Rosenzweig also expresses his belief in the sufficiency of the existing waivers of 
material support to the groups issued exemptions by DOS and DHS. He argues that this 
condition makes the current state of the legislation acceptable both in terms of providing 
immigration benefits to deserving foreign nationals and in maintaining the greatest protection of 
national security via continued, ample discretionary authority.76  
 Three years later, in 2010, DHS’ Former Special Advisor for Refugee and Asylum 
Affairs Igor V. Timofeyev argued against the Refugee Protection Act of 2010, which proposed 
changes to the INA’s inadmissibility provisions, including removal of the Tier III statute.  
Timofeyev argued against the modifications, saying, 
We must remain a welcoming home to refugees and asylum seekers from around the 
world. But we must also be cognizant of the important role that the immigration law 
plays in our counter-terrorism and immigration enforcement efforts. In recognition of the 
unfortunate realities of today’s dangerous world, it is essential that immigration law 
provides agencies in the executive branch with the flexibility necessary to deny 
admission to the United States, or to deny protection once inside the country, to 
dangerous individuals, such as individuals who support terrorist organizations.77 
 
He, like Rosenzweig speaking three years earlier, also acknowledges the sufficiency of the 
waiver process, arguing, 
There are, of course, groups that have been encompassed within the Tier III designation 
whose activities do not prose [sic] a threat to the United States. Indeed, some of these 
groups have engaged in these activities in order to defend themselves against oppressive 
foreign regimes, and in some instances have done so with the encouragement of the 
United States. The existing waiver authority allows the Executive to exempt both 
members and supporters of these organizations from the terrorism inadmissibility bars, 
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and the Executive has exercised this authority with respect to at least a dozen 
organizations since 2006 to the present.78 
 
The Refugee Protection Act of 2010 never became law. 
Impact 
 Inherently, the no modification proposal would have no impact on the definition of 
terrorism and terrorist organizations as it exists under Tier III. It would also have no impact on 
the complaints lodged concerning the status of refugees and asylum seekers under the Tier III 
and related provisions, nor on the case backlog which exists—negative or positive. The no 
modification proposal thus appears as a control-type case. Though, to consider this proposal 
purely as a control is misleading because it is a viable policy option. The final classification of 
the no modification proposal is depicted in Table V.C.1. 
Table V.C.1 Criticism 1: 
Tier III 
Overbreadth 
Criticism 2: 
Refugee 
Bars 
Criticism 3: 
Case 
Backlog 
Proposal 1: 
No 
Modification 
Unchanged  Unchanged  Unchanged  
 
 
2. Modification of the exemption/waiver processes via expanded categories or authority for 
issuing of exemptions/waivers. 
 
As previously noted, several relevant exemption authorities already exist. These include 
the authority to waive the TRIG statutes’ invocation or to exempt individuals from many of the 
TRIG provisions (individual), the authority to exempt entire groups from the Tier III provision 
(categorical), and the authority to exempt individuals providing material support to organizations 
and individuals engaged in terrorist activity (individual or categorical).79 The recommendations 
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to modify the exemption/waiver authority are many and nuanced, but ultimately can be 
considered one or a combination of three types of proposed change: 1) expanding the categories 
of persons/groups eligible to receive exemptions/waivers for which the issuing authority already 
exists, 2) expanding the waiver authority to offer different types of waivers (i.e. for different 
aspects of the INA §212(a)(3)(B) provisions than are currently offered), or 3) modifying the 
process through which a waiver can be received in order to decrease the time a given case spends 
in immigration proceedings.  
One need only refer back to the extensive list of examples of organizations which qualify 
for Tier III inadmissibility but which are not considered terrorist organizations in other U.S. 
government contexts, compiled by HRF (above), to see that there are numerous candidates for 
continued categorical (and individual) exemptions/waivers to the TRIG provisions. HRF implies 
that further issuance of categorical waivers would be beneficial, and explains that while a 
solution addressing the breadth of the Tier III definition would be ideal, the issuance of 
individual waivers continues to be necessary despite the plagued system for doing such.80 
 The recommendations for expanded waiver authority to different types of waivers are 
also diverse. They include: expanded waiver authority for material support provided under 
duress,81 waivers for spouses and children of terrorists, waivers of Tier III findings in cases 
where individuals have already undergone immigration screening processes (e.g. those who are 
filing for change of status) and received immigration or relief status as a result of the prior 
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application.82 The latter recommendations are especially geared towards the “key flaws in the 
immigration court waiver process” as delineated by HRF.83  
 Similarly, HRF argues that the INA§240 waiver authority should be able to be utilized 
immediately after grounds for relief are found if the only relevant inadmissibility is the terrorism 
bar, and furthermore, that removal proceedings should not be completed until exercise of the 
waiver is considered.  In a related recommendation, HRF suggests that waiver decisions should 
be permitted at the same time as the decision in the immigration case by granting the Attorney 
General waiver authority in cases before DOJ, which he may delegate to immigration courts.84 
HRF also recommends that all cases eligible for waiver privileges should be forwarded from 
immigration proceedings to U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) for review to 
ensure proper consideration prior to deportation.85 
Notably, the recommendations for expanded waiver/exemption authority are very similar 
to the recommendations in Proposals 3-6. The difference is that the proposals recommend 
systematic change to the provisions, whereas the institution of waiver authority means that the 
invocation of the provision can be presumed inapplicable by an exercise of discretion on the part 
of agency and adjudicating officials. Thus inherent in the waiver or exemption authority is the 
continued exercise of discretion. 
 These recommendations do not imply a specific method of implementation. However one 
can assume that the implementation of additional waiver/exemption authority would occur in the 
same way as it has in the past—through procedural decrees or additional modifying legislation. 
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In this case, the method of implementation will not have a significant effect on the impact of the 
proposal. 
Impact 
The proposed modifications to the waiver process do not directly or indirectly modify the 
definition of an undesignated terrorist organization as it appears in the INA. Expanded 
waiver/exemption authority does not constitute a change to the language of the TRIG provisions, 
but merely represents the option to determine the provision inapplicable in certain instances. 
Therefore the changes are not systematic, but are almost by definition idiosyncratic in their 
application. Unchanged is therefore the classification for Criticism 1.  
Changes to the waiver authority and process also would not modify the legislation’s 
definition of material support directly or indirectly, and thus neither do they indirectly limit the 
scope of the Tier III provision. This means that there is also no direct effect on the effective bars 
to refugee and asylum seekers, or Criticism 2. Because the modifications to the 
waiver/exemption authority or processes do not affect the language of the definition of a Tier III 
terrorist organization, there is also no indirect effect on the effective bars to refugee and asylum 
seekers.  
However, it is important to note two exceptions. First, the institution of more categorical 
exemptions/waivers to relieve groups of the Tier III terrorist organization label would shrink the 
inner circle in Figure 1, and would proportionally shrink the material support outer circle. This 
would constitute an indirect effect on the effective bars to refugee and asylum seekers IF those 
providing material support to the exempted organizations were refugees. Because of the specific 
nature of categorical exemptions/waivers, the reduction in the inner circle is likely to be very 
slight—dependent upon the number of groups waived/exempted. Second, the additional 
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influence of categorical exemptions/waivers for material support provided to certain 
organizations would shrink the outer, material support circle of Figure 1 and would also 
constitute an indirect effect on Criticism 2.  
 When considering the impact of this proposal on case backlog, it is important to make a 
distinction between the effects of exemptions and waivers. In terms of case backlog, the 
implementation of exemptions theoretically should not induce a greater backlog (except perhaps 
temporarily while the authority is implemented). This is because exemptions are determined by 
an interagency process and implicitly relieve cases of the Tier III distinction entirely, thus 
nullifying the need for case review.  
However, with the implementation of a waiver authority we do not know how the 
administrative review of cases will be affected. Waivers require decisions on a case-by-case 
basis, and these are currently made at the decision of a principal, whose authority is not widely 
delegated. (Although one of the proposals is to delegate §240 waiver authority more widely 
and/or allow the waiver decision to be made at more stages of the immigration proceedings.) 
Increased availability of waivers could increase the number of cases under review and/or the 
time in reviewing cases which would have to undergo extensive immigration proceedings 
anyway, thus requiring more time and effort on the part of case defenders and adjudicators. 
However, one could make the argument that the increased availability of waivers of certain 
types—such as the duress and de minimis material support waivers—would enable more efficient 
defense of immigration cases, especially refugee and asylum cases, thus reducing the overall 
backlog as a set of cases is tried more easily and more quickly. Consequently, waivers could 
exacerbate or reduce the case backlog.  
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Thus in classifying the effect of Proposal 2 on Criticism 3, one can conclude the 
differential effects of exemptions, which would have a reducing effect on the accumulation of 
cases, and waivers, which could have a reducing or exacerbating effect dependent upon type, 
extent of use, and resultant bureaucratic processes. 
Table 
V.C.2 
Criticism 1: 
Tier III 
Overbreadth 
Criticism 2: 
Refugee 
Bars 
Criticism 3: 
Case  
Backlog 
Proposal 
2: Waiver/ 
Exemption 
Categories 
& 
Issuance 
Unchanged  Unchanged/ Indirect 
Reduced 
(exemptions);   
Exacerbated/ 
Reduced     
(waivers) 
 
3. Creation of a de minimis level of material support or of a more restricted definition of 
material support to terrorist organizations.  
 
 One of the most common suggestions for modification of the TRIG statutes is the 
introduction of a de minimis level of support—or the introduction of a minimum level of support 
which permits admissibility and over which an applicant is considered inadmissible.  
There has already been discussion in immigration courts as to whether or not the 
legislation was intended to preclude a de minimis level of support. Indeed it is an argument 
already put forth in defense of immigration applicants, including refugees and asylum seekers, 
against the material support bar.86 In the only published decision considering the terrorism-
related inadmissibility, the Board of Immigration Appeals argued that ‘“We are unaware of any 
legislative history which indicates a limitation on the definition of the term ‘material support’”’ 
and “the statute is “clearly drafted” to prevent ostensibly benign contributions…”87 
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 Georgetown University Law Center’s 2006 report, “Unintended Consequences,” provides 
a concise summation of the controversy over the intent of the drafters of the statute, inclusive of 
its own opinion, saying: 
Without an exception or waiver for de minimis situations, refugees like these will 
be unable to find safety in the United States. That interpretation of the law is problematic 
because it reads the word “material” out of the term “material support.” Had Congress 
intended to bar de minimis contributions, they could have written the law simply to 
prohibit “support.” The choice to include the word “material” indicates it that was not 
Congress’s intention to punish contributions so tiny that they could have no material 
effect on terrorist capabilities. 
The Department of Homeland Security, however, has argued the opposite. It 
argued before the Bureau of Immigration Appeals (BIA) and the United States Third 
Circuit Court of Appeals that Congress did not intend for the material support provision 
to include a de minimis exception, but rather that “material support” is a legal term of art 
that means any support, no matter how insignificant. The DHS interpretation effectively 
reads the word “material” out of the provision and concludes that even a contribution of a 
glass of water is “material” to the support of terrorists.88 
 
Georgetown University’s Fact-Finding Investigation consequently recommends that Congress 
and DHS recognize a de minimis level of support.89 
HRF proposes that the de minimis level of support be implemented through an 
interpretive adjustment on the part of appropriate agencies and authorities, and not by statutory 
reform. This means that rather than changing the language of the actual statute to preclude de 
minimis levels of support, the officials involved should simply begin to interpret the provision to 
do so.  
In the case of either statutory or interpretive reform, the institution of a de minimis level 
of support implies a case-by-case determination by consular, Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE) or court officials as to whether the support provided was at or below the de 
minimis level. Currently, the Board of Immigration Appeals does not have a precedent for 
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establishing a de minimis level of material support, though the argument that support did not 
meet a de minimis level has “fared well” in immigration courts.90 Thus while it is possible to 
conceive of a set of subclauses detailing the de minimis level and type of material support, 
determining such would be a massive bureaucratic and research-intensive undertaking, and 
would likely not have the legal nuance that the variety of cases of material support provided to 
undesignated terrorist organizations would require. Because the de minimis defense has 
performed well in courts so far without a pre-existing precedent or definite level of material 
support, the value added to attempting the creation of one is limited. It is more likely that, as 
HRF recommends, the introduction of a de minimis level will consist of a change in adjudicatory 
attitude than in legislative design. 
Impact 
The implementation of a de minimis level of material support would not alter the 
definition of an undesignated terrorist organization. But it would reduce the number of 
invocations of the Tier III provision by shrinking the amount of material support considered 
inadmissible, because any support below the de minimis level would not trigger the 
inadmissibility. This amounts to a reduction in the size of the outer circle of Figure 1, and is 
classified as an indirect impact on Criticism 1. The implementation of a de minimis level of 
support would be a systematic alteration of the scope of the Tier III provision—that is regardless 
of the group to which one provides support, support below the de minimis level is permissible. 
Figure 3 depicts this effect. In Figure 3 the material support circle from Figure 1 is divided into 
material support provided under the de minimis level of support and material support provided 
over the de minimis level. With the institution of the recommended interpretive change 
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 precluding de minimis levels of support from inadmissibility, 
resulting a smaller number of inadmissibility cases.
Because the de minimis proposal directly limits 
proposal is classified as a direct amelioration of
However, it is important to recognize that
refugee or asylum by material support provided to 
the de minimis level. 
The de minimis proposal 
significantly because the recommended 
support. This means that the final determination will 
principal or in an immigration court who determines that it meets the 
explored on a case-by-case basis. 
defended on the basis of de minimis levels of support
immigration proceedings, but ultimately 
admissibility than of inadmissibility. Thus the case backlog would be 
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Table 
V.C.3 
Criticism 1: 
Tier III 
Overbreadth 
Criticism 2: 
Refugee 
Bars 
Criticism 3: 
Case 
Backlog 
Proposal 3: 
De Minimis 
Support 
Indirect  Direct  Unchanged  
 
4. Creation of an exception for material support provided under duress. 
 
One of the major grievances resulting from the lack of a duress exception is that it means 
individuals who are victims of terrorist activity are being accused of complicity or assistance in 
those activities and organizations. Material support provided under duress means that the 
individuals were somehow coerced or forced into the provision of aid to the organization. There 
is a degree of irony in declaring inadmissible on terrorism-related grounds the action of an 
individual who was himself “terrorized” into performing that action.  
Georgetown University Law Center’s 2006 report finds that in 73% of material support 
cases studied, the support was provided under duress, in contrast to 3% voluntarily provided and 
24% provided inadvertently (discussed below).91As a result, the report recommends both that 
Congress “establish an involuntary support exception for those who provided “support” under 
explicit or implicit duress.”92 HRF’s report similarly recommends to Congress that it amend the 
legislation to remove acts of material support performed under coercion from TRIG arguing that, 
in addition to the injustice which it represents, up until 2005 duress was recognized as a valid 
defense for the undesired/unintentional provision of material support in the courts.93 The 
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Refugee Protection Act of 2010 also recommended altering the language of the INA to except 
coerced acts of material support.94 
The exception for material support provided under duress is the first of the proposals 
considered in this analysis which would amount to an actual modification of the statutory 
inadmissibility language in the INA. The exception for material support provided under duress 
would likely be implemented by direct insertion into the language of the INA through a 
legislative amendment into the material support provision, or §212(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI). Section 4(3) 
of the Refugee Protection Act of 2010 proposed the insertion of the phrase “other than as a result 
of coercion” after “to commit an act” in the material support provision of the INA,95 thereby 
excepting individuals who were coerced into the provision of material support. The Act defined 
coercion to mean “(I) serious harm, including restraint against any person; or (II) any scheme, 
plan, or pattern intended to cause a person to believe that failure to perform an act would result 
in serious harm to, or restraint against, any person.”96  
The argument for the implementation of an exception of material support provided under 
duress is not limited to material support provided to undesignated terrorist organizations, though 
such is the concern of this analysis. The recommendation extends to material support provided to 
Tier I and II terrorist organizations—which is why a statutory amendment to the material support 
language, which would also apply to Tier I and II terrorist organizations, is appropriate and 
possible. Husarska (2008) argues that individuals providing material support to these 
organizations face no less difficult choices or injustice than individuals providing support under 
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 duress to Tier III organizations.97
exemption authority for material support provided under duress in February of 2007, he did
only for support provided to Tier III terrorist organizations (only later extending it to a few Tier I 
terrorist organizations).98  
For the purposes of conceptualizing this change, the outer circle in 
best represented by its division into two parts
“material support not provided under duress
is included in the INA, the outermost circle drops out and the number of individuals barred i
reduced. 
Impact 
The proposed addition of a duress exception does not narrow the Tier III definition of a 
terrorist organization directly, but does shrink the Tier III inadmissibility 
limitation of the material support provision. 
terrorist organization by exempting
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specific organization to which support was provided—from inadmissibility for material support 
to an undesignated terrorist organization.  
The inclusion of a duress exception would also limit the number of valid refugee and 
asylum cases barred under the Tier III-related inadmissibility, and is in fact likely geared toward 
remedying this particular criticism of the legislation. If Georgetown University Law Center’s 
statistics are representative of the overall population of refugee applicants providing material 
support to Tier III terrorist organizations, we could expect the inclusion of a duress exception in 
the language of the INA to reduce the number of refugee cases barred under material support 
provided to Tier III terrorist organizations by nearly three-quarters. Because the proposal 
modifies the language of the INA’s material support provision directly, it constitutes a direct 
effect on the effective bars to refugees and asylum seekers. 
A duress exception would also have an effect on the current case backlog, as those cases 
which were under consideration for waivers of material support provided under duress or 
awaiting court review would be there unnecessarily. Again, it is unclear what type of 
administrative process would clear the immigration system of cases currently undergoing review 
and meeting the duress exception criteria. But with regard to future cases, fewer (up to 73% if 
Georgetown Law Center’s statistics are representative) refugee and asylum cases would be held 
in immigration proceedings for material support provided to terrorist organizations. This would 
be due to the implementation of the duress exception directly into the language of the INA, 
which would limit delays in the immigration review process as determinations that the exception 
applied could be made by immigration officials in the field and would not necessarily require 
review by a court or principal. 
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Table 
V.C.4 
Criticism 1: 
Tier III 
Overbreadth 
Criticism 2: 
Refugee 
Bars 
Criticism 3: 
Case 
Backlog 
Proposal 4: 
Duress 
Exception 
Indirect  Direct  Reduced  
 
 The case of inadvertence and other conditions of material support.  
 Apart from the controversial nature of material support provided under duress or below a 
significant level, there also exist issues of inadvertent material support and material support 
provided on the basis of personal relationships to members of undesignated terrorist groups.  
 For instance, both Georgetown University’s Fact-Finding Investigation and HRF 
recommend that an exception be developed for support provided prior to an age at which 
legitimate consent can be given.99 This would prevent the young daughters and sons of terrorists 
or young children coerced into support for terrorist organizations from being barred on the basis 
of material support. HRF similarly recommends that the TRIG provisions not apply to a person 
simply by virtue of an individual’s being the spouse or child of a terrorist.100 
Inadvertent provision of material support is the exact opposite of material support 
provided under duress. Where in a duress situation the individual providing support presumably 
knows to whom the support is going but gives it despite this in the face of some threat, 
inadvertent support is provided to persons of whose identity the provider is unaware.  
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 Though unresolved, the question of whether mens rea, or “guilty conscience,” is relevant 
in material support cases has been considered by the Board of Immigration Appeals.101 Clearly in 
a case of inadvertence, the provider of material support should not have a guilty conscience. 
According to Georgetown University Law Center’s study, in cases of material support provided 
by refugees to armed groups, 24% were instances of inadvertent provision.102 This clearly raises 
the question of whether inadvertence should also be considered in the legislation governing 
terrorism-related inadmissibility. 
 The inclusion of these recommendations, made less frequently and with less specificity 
than those considered in this analysis, would modify the extent of the Tier III and related 
inadmissibility in nearly exactly the same way as the duress exception: limiting indirectly the 
scope of Tier III inadmissibility, directly reducing the number of refugees and asylum seekers 
barred, and potentially reducing the current case backlog. 
 
5. Introduction of the elements of “intent” and/or representation of a threat to national 
security into the Tier III provision.  
 
A major component of Criticism 1 of the breadth of the INA’s definition of an 
undesignated terrorist organization is the lack of a requirement for the individual/group to pose 
an explicit national security threat to the United States or, further, to show credible intent to harm 
the United States once granted immigration privileges. Both are key components of the 
designation of a Foreign Terrorist Organization (Tier I) by the Secretary of State under §219 of 
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the INA, and one or both are included in most academic and Federal agency definitions of 
terrorism.103  
 A State Department report, as quoted by Nezer et al., laments that the Tier III provision 
bars “some individuals and groups who are engaged in opposition to repressive regimes, 
including some who present no apparent national security risk and to whom the U.S. is 
sympathetic”104 Similarly, Husarska (2008) argues that the lack of these elements allows the 
legislation to bar individuals who have directly supported U.S. missions. Such is the case of 
Saman Kareem Ahmad, a Kurdish translator working for the U.S. marines—even at times in 
Quantico, Virginia—who was barred for his involvement in the Kurdish Democratic Party,105 an 
organization which was arguably abetted by U.S. actions in Iraq. In a 2007 testimony before the 
Senate Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Human Rights and the Law, both HRF 
attorney Anwen Hughes and Bishop Thomas Wenski express concern for the lack of national 
security considerations, especially pertaining to refugee and asylum cases of material support.106  
 As a result of such criticisms, HRF’s report and the Refugee Protection Act of 2010 make 
similar proposals regarding the introduction of intent and national security elements into the Tier 
III provision. Specifically, they recommend the exclusion from the language of the INA 
activities which are not unlawful under international law and which are not against 
noncombatant civilians,107 or activities which are not for the purposes of intimidation (or 
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coercion),108 respectively. The report and the Refugee Act thereby implicitly argue that those 
activities which are unlawful under international law or which are undertaken against 
noncombatants or for the purposes of intimidation fulfill the appropriate criteria for consideration 
as “terrorism.” Such requirements narrow the scope of the provision in such a way that those 
barred would pose explicit risk.109  
 The implementation of this proposal would likely be by legislative amendment directly 
into the Tier III definition of a terrorist organization. This is evident in HRF’s method of 
recommendation. HRF makes the recommendation directly to Congress, who does not have the 
authority to interpret the legislation with regard to immigration cases, but writes and enacts the 
relevant provisions. The Refugee Protection Act of 2010 also proposed to modify the language 
of the INA, not to alter the interpretation of it. However it is not clear whether the intent and 
national security exceptions would be directed at individuals or at entire groups.  
Impact 
By excluding individuals who do not demonstrate intent to perform terrorist activity or 
who do not represent a national security threat to the U.S., the Intent/National Security Proposal 
shrinks the inner circle in Figure 1, depicted below in Figure 5.  By systematically excluding any 
groups otherwise meeting the Tier III criteria but demonstrating no intent to harm and posing no 
national security risk, this proposal creates a direct impact on the Tier III definition of a terrorist 
organization.  
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 The Refugee Protection Act 2010 §4(2). 
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 The Refugee Protection Act of 2010 and HRF both recommend the disuse of the definition of Tier III entirely, 
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of Tier III decisions to consider the presence or not of a national security threat is likely to 
require agency and interagency review. This type of review is different from the current review 
of immigration cases which involve primarily DHS and DOJ, and sometimes DOS, or simply 
review of a principal. National security decision-making could also involve the National Security 
Council and other White House or executive offices. Therefore it could be argued that rather than 
reducing the case backlog, the introduction of national security elements into the Tier III 
provision could exacerbate the administrative backlog of cases by involving more agencies in 
individual cases. 
Table 
V.C.5 
Criticism 1: 
Tier III 
Overbreadth 
Criticism 2: 
Refugee 
Bars 
Criticism 3: 
Case 
Backlog 
Proposal 
5: Intent/ 
National 
Security 
Direct  Indirect  Exacerbated/ Reduced 
 
Notably, it is also possible to conceive of an interpretive change method to introducing 
national security/intent into the Tier III provision, much like that recommended in Proposal 3 for 
the introduction of a de minimis level of support. Such would constitute no change in the case 
backlog, as cases would undergo administrative and judicial review to consider whether intent or 
national security threats are present/credible. Such a proposal would still constitute a direct effect 
on the definition of a Tier III terrorist organization and an indirect impact on the effective bars to 
refugee and asylum, but because of the discretion accorded to courts and reviewing officials 
would reduce the number of Tier III inadmissibilities to a lesser extent. However, this 
interpretive case is not the implementation method proposed. 
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6. Do not apply the Tier III provision retroactively, that is to groups which have given up 
terrorist activities or for activities which ceased prior to the enactment of the relevant 
legislation. 
 
Because the Tier III provision can be enacted retroactively—applied to groups who have 
ceased to carry out violent activities and to activities which took place before the enactment of 
the legislation, a larger number of immigration cases have been barred by Tier III than would 
otherwise be the case. One of the most commonly cited flaws with regard to the breadth of the 
Tier III definition of a terrorist organization is its retroactive application to organizations no 
longer participating in terrorist activity, as well as to activities which took place well before the 
October 2001 enactment of the USA PATRIOT Act. In some cases, determining the 
inadmissibility for groups or individuals for whom the bars have been enacted retroactively has 
resulted in archival research to produce exemptions for persons living in the U.S. for decades.110 
The retroactive application of Tier III to activities undertaken by the ANC during apartheid is 
what resulted in the politically embarrassing inadmissibility of Nelson Mandela and a former 
South African Ambassador to the U.S.111  
Retroactive application of the Tier III and related inadmissibility provisions is especially 
problematic in cases where individuals achieved immigration status prior to the enactment of the 
USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 or the Real ID Act of 2005, and are attempting, post-enactment, to 
bring families to join them or to change immigration status. In such instances, activities which 
bar them from obtaining immigration status under the Tier III or material support provisions 
were irrelevant during the first immigration application.  
                                                 
110Human Rights First. (2009.) “Denial and Delay: The Impact of the Immigration Law’s “Terrorism Bars” on 
Asylum Seekers and Refugees in the United States.”November 2009:  7. 
111
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HRF explicitly recommends to the DOS, DHS, and DOJ that the Tier III provision cease 
to apply to groups which have given up violence.112 Georgetown University similarly proposes 
that a “time bar” be imposed by Congress and interpreted into the provision by DHS. This would 
exclude material support provided in the past beyond a certain time limit.[113][114] HRF maintains 
that individuals who pose a risk to the U.S. as a result of activities taking place prior to the 
enactment of the legislation may be barred by statutes other than Tier III, and that the growing 
list of defunct groups barred by Tier III serves no national security purpose.115 Furthermore, HRF 
argues that in cases where the provision is applied retroactively, the reviewing agencies should 
confirm the individual’s involvement in the activities, as well as the group’s sanction of the 
activities to ensure that individual acts of violence are not wrongly attributed to entire groups of 
people.[116][117]  
The proposal that the Tier III provision should not be applied retroactively could be 
implemented through interpretive changes, wherein the statutory language itself remains 
unchanged but agencies and immigration officials do not consider those activities/groups prior to 
the enactment of the relevant legislation. It could also be implemented by the addition of 
language into the Tier III provision through legislative amendment. Both would limit the 
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 Ibid. 
113
 Fleming, Mark, Emi McLean and Amanda Taub, eds. (2006) “Unintended Consequences: Refugee Victims of the 
War on Terror.” Georgetown University Law Center Human Rights Institute Refugee Fact-Finding Mission. May 
2006:  8. 
114
 Georgetown University’s Fact-Finding report also applies the phrase “time bar” to the  recommendation 
precluding support provided prior to an appropriate age of consent. 
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 Human Rights First. (2009.) “Denial and Delay: The Impact of the Immigration Law’s “Terrorism Bars” on 
Asylum Seekers and Refugees in the United States.”November 2009: 12, 28. 
116
 Similarly, Human Rights First argues that Tier III organizations should only be deemed so as the result of 
actions of a subgroup when these actions are integral to the operations of the larger group, which will prevent the 
labeling of peaceful political parties. This constitutes a wholly separate, but related, proposal which is not 
considered here because it implies that the determination of a group as Tier III is incorrect in some instances. For the 
purposes of this research, one must assume that a provision is interpreted correctly in all instances. 
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 In a related but unique recommendation for modifications to the material support provisions, Georgetown 
University Law Center’s Human Rights Institute’s Refugee Fact-Finding Investigation proposes that the material 
support provision only be applied to organizations already labeled Tier III, and not to individuals providing support 
to organizations which could be considered Tier III but which have not yet been determined to qualify as such. 
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application of Tier III to ongoing activities or activities which took place after the enactment of 
the relevant legislation.  
Impact 
In the case of either method of implementation, the impact of the non-retroactivity 
proposal would be the same. Because the proposal would exclude defunct groups and a number 
of past activities from determination as an undesignated terrorist organization, it would shrink 
the inner circle of Figure 1. However, this does not constitute a systematic limitation of the 
definition of a Tier III terrorist organization. The characteristics of groups whose activities took 
place prior to the enactment of the legislation is not necessarily categorically distinct from the 
activities undertaken by groups after the enactment of the legislation. The difference is only one 
of timing. Accordingly there is no change to the philosophy of the Tier III definition of a terrorist 
organization. The alleged over-breadth of the definition itself would not be corrected, despite the 
reduction in the number of cases of Tier III inadmissibility, and so Criticism 1 is classified as 
unchanged. 
Given that the shrinking of the inner circle proportionally reduces the outer, material 
support circle, the narrowing of the definition of Tier III to exclude such past activities indirectly 
limits the effective bars to refugees and asylum seekers by reducing the material support 
inadmissibility proportional to the number of groups removed from the Tier III determination.  
 Regardless of whether the non-retroactivity language is written into the legislation or 
implemented merely through an interpretive adjustment, the case backlog would be reduced. The 
method of implementation is irrelevant because it is a simple task to determine whether the 
relevant activities took place before a certain date, and thus authority to determine such is easily 
delegated to field officers reviewing immigration applications. Even if such determinations are 
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required to be reported to principals or to the interagency, such determinations are unlikely to 
require extensive review. After the implementation of the non-retroactivity proposal, all cases of 
Tier III activities taking place prior to the enactment of the relevant legislation would no longer 
be considered inadmissible, and so the accumulation of immigration cases would be reduced. 
The impact on Criticism 3 is accordingly classified as reduced. 
Table V.C.6 
Criticism 1: 
Tier III 
Overbreadth 
Criticism 2: 
Refugee 
Bars 
Criticism 3: 
Case 
Backlog 
Proposal 6: 
Non- 
Retroactivity 
Unchanged  Indirect  Reduced  
 
 
7. Introduction of a “designated” list of Tier III terrorist organizations. 
 
While there have been no official recommendations to impose a Tier III ‘designation list,’ 
the lack thereof is significant and is the primary difference between the Tier I and Tier II 
designations and the Tier III determination. The closest recommendation to the institution of a 
designation list comes from Georgetown University’s Fact-Finding Investigation, which 
recommended to Congress that the U.S. government “certify” a Tier III terrorist organization 
before material support provided to the organization may be considered inadmissible.118 Thus the 
effect of implementing a designation list is worth exploring. 
Certainly there is an inherent trade-off between the public nature of a designation list and 
the discretion accorded to government officials by the current use of the Tier III definition. If a 
designation list were created, to designate an organization as Tier III would likely require a good 
                                                 
118
 The method of “certification” is unspecified. The distinction between certification and designation is also unclear, 
although it is possible that a certification list would consider only Tier III organizations which have already been 
determined by prior immigration cases, and not create a list of organizations from outside sources, as a designation 
list would. 
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deal of effort on the part of officials hoping to bar an individual/group under the provision. Thus 
discretion is inherently limited. It would also become an even more political event to make a Tier 
III determination than it is currently if a designation list were created. The primary goal of a 
terrorist designation list is the result of its being made public, which may act through persuasion 
or punishment as leverage against the organizations named.119 To avoid such political 
consequences (and to protect the privacy of individuals undergoing immigration processing), 
when a Federal judge recently asked DHS to file a list of organizations which were being 
considered undesignated terrorist organizations, DHS filed the list confidentially.120  
Impact 
In the event of the introduction of a designated list of Tier III terrorist organizations, the 
number of organizations considered to be Tier III is likely to be reduced. How much it is reduced 
depends on how many organizations are designated, which in turn depends on the political 
impact of designating an organization as Tier III and the bureaucratic processes required to 
perform the designation. It is possible to imagine that the number of Tier III designations would 
not be reduced at all from its current size, if every organization which could be labeled Tier III 
under the current definition was designated. (This possibility is represented in Table V.C.7 by 
the “*”.) However, the likelihood of such a coincidence is very small, and thus here we will 
presume that a designated list would reduce the number of Tier III determinations.  
While the introduction of a designated list does not systematically narrow the definition, 
the public nature of the list as well as the bureaucratic processes of deliberation would probably 
serve to limit the extent of the Tier III definition. Without changes to the language of the INA’s 
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Tier III provision, any groups which are subsumed by the wide berth of the current definition 
would still be eligible to be designated. However, the creation of a designation list would 
necessitate the creation of a process and standards for designation, which would limit the Tier III 
inadmissibility. One could consequently assume that the creation of a list would limit the impact 
of Tier III. For instance, it is unlikely that the African National Congress would have been added 
to a designation list after 2001 as a Tier III terrorist organization. Thus classification of the 
impact on the definition of a Tier III terrorist organization is indirect, as the extent of the 
provision is systematically limited, but not through definitional changes.  
It is clear that the impact on the effective bars to refugees and asylum seekers would also 
be classified as indirect, as when the number of Tier III determinations is reduced, the material 
support bar’s impact is also minimized proportionally.  
While the production of a designated list would require massive bureaucratic effort, as 
would the addition/subtraction of a group from the list, the actual number of immigration cases 
contributing to the administrative backlog would be reduced inversely proportional to the 
number of groups designated. The more groups designated, the less the backlog is reduced (or 
the more Tier III cases which would be required undergo immigration proceedings, court review, 
etc.).  
Table V.C.7 
Criticism 1: 
Tier III 
Overbreadth 
Criticism 2: 
Refugee 
Bars 
Criticism 3: 
Case 
Backlog 
Proposal 7: 
Designated 
List 
Indirect* Indirect* Reduced* 
*Represents the possibility that no change will occur if all  
the potential Tier III organizations were to be designated as such. 
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8. Removal of the Tier III provision. 
The most drastic of the recommendations to modify the Tier III and related 
inadmissibility provisions is to completely repeal it. Both the Refugee Protection Act of 2010, 
sponsored by Senator Patrick Leahy D-VT, and HRF’s report argue for the repeal of the Tier III 
statutory provision by an amendment to the INA.121 The proposal to remove the Tier III 
provision entirely has been put forth chiefly by groups and individuals concerned for the welfare 
of refugees (e.g. HRF, implicitly by Erica Feller of the Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees, Senator Leahy D-VT through his sponsorship of the Refugee 
Protection Act of 2010).  
HRF’s report argues that for individuals who do pose a direct threat to the U.S., statutory 
bars already exist to bar them from immigration privileges, thus highlighting the redundancy of 
the Tier III provision. “Involvement with armed groups engaged in hostilities against the United 
States could also trigger the separate statutory bar excluding from protection anyone whom 
‘there are reasonable grounds for regarding…as a danger to the security of the United States.’”122 
Feller (2006) argues that legislation also exists in international law already to prevent abuse of 
the refugee and asylum systems, and thus the legislation, such as the TRIG provisions, imposed 
on refugees and asylum seekers by the U.S. and other states is unnecessarily broad and 
outmoded.123 
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The Refugee Protection Act of 2010 proposal to remove the statutory Tier III provision 
reads: 
(4) in clause (vi)— 
(A) in subclause (I), by adding ‘‘or’’ at the end; 
(B) in subclause (II), by striking ‘‘; or’’and inserting a period; and 
(C) by striking subclause (III); …124 
  
Impact 
The removal of the Tier III provision entirely would clearly amount to a direct! impact 
Criticism 1 by removing the over-breadth entirely. (The “!” indicates the extreme nature of the 
impact, as with the implementation of this proposal, the criticisms themselves become non-
existent.) The ambiguity which is the subject of Criticism 1 would be entirely removed with the 
removal of the Tier III provision. 
 If the Tier III provision were removed, it is clear that the issue of material support 
provided to undesignated terrorist organizations (though not to Tier I or II terrorist organizations) 
would also be eliminated. While the material support bar would remain, material support to Tier 
III organizations would no longer exist as a terrorism-related inadmissibility. Thus this would 
constitute an indirect! impact on the effective bars to refugee and asylum.  
 If the Tier III provision were eliminated, the case backlog of Tier III inadmissibilities 
would not merely be reduced, but would be eliminated. Thus it is classified in Table V.C.8 as 
reduced! to indicate the extreme nature of the reduction.  
Table 
V.C.8 
Criticism 1: 
Tier III 
Overbreadth 
Criticism 2: 
Refugee 
Bars 
Criticism 3: 
Case 
Backlog 
Proposal 8: 
Removal of 
Tier III 
Direct! Indirect! Reduced! 
! Represents the extreme nature of the classifications. 
                                                 
124
 The Refugee Protection Act of 2010§4(4). 
McCarthy 76 
 
Review 
In summary, Table V.C.9 shows the impact determinations discussed above of each of 
the proposals in comparison to one another. 
Table V.C.9 Criticism 1: 
Tier III 
Overbreadth 
Criticism 2: 
Refugee 
Bars 
Criticism 3: 
Case  
Backlog 
Proposal 1: 
No 
Modification 
Unchanged  Unchanged  Unchanged  
Proposal 2: 
Waiver/ 
Exemption 
Categories & 
Issuance 
Unchanged  Unchanged/ Indirect 
Reduced 
(exemptions);  
Exacerbated/ 
Reduced     
(waivers) 
Proposal 3: 
De Minimis 
Support 
Indirect  Direct  Unchanged  
Proposal 4: 
Duress 
Exception 
Indirect  Direct  Reduced  
Proposal 5: 
Intent/ 
National 
Security 
Direct  Indirect  Exacerbated/ Reduced 
Proposal 6: 
Non-
Retroactivity 
Unchanged Indirect  Reduced  
Proposal 7: 
Designated 
List 
Indirect*  Indirect*  Reduced*  
Proposal 8: 
Removal of 
Tier III 
Direct! Indirect! Reduced! 
 
Proposal 1, for no change to the TRIG provisions, has the least impact in that none of the 
Criticisms 1-3 are affected, and Proposal 8 for Removal of Tier III, clearly has the greatest 
impact in that all three Criticisms are theoretically removed. Proposals 4, 7 and 8—for a duress 
exception, a designated list, and removal of Tier III, respectively—all alleviate each of the 
criticisms indirectly or directly. Proposal 3, or the introduction of a de minimis level of support, 
ameliorates Criticisms 1 and 2, but because it requires administrative review or court decisions to 
determine its applicability, it does not reduce the case backlog. Only Proposals 2 and 5 for 
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expanded waiver/exemption issuance and intent/national security elements, respectively, have 
the potential to exacerbate the case backlog as it is currently structured. In the case of Proposal 2, 
waivers could potentially induce longer or more reviews of Tier III cases. However, increased 
exemptions could reduce the case backlog. Otherwise, Proposal 2 could potentially alleviate 
Criticism 2, but would have no effect on Criticism 1. In contrast, Proposal 5 could alleviate all 3 
criticisms except for Criticism 3, in which the potential for exacerbation of case backlog exists 
given the politically sensitive nature of national security concerns. 
 As discussed in Part B, because the majority of the spaces in Table V.C.9 indicate the 
alleviation of the criticisms (17 to19 of 24), one can tentatively conclude that the implementation 
of proposed changes to the INA’s TRIG provisions could have a positive effect on the legislation, 
or at least on its reputation. Only two spaces indicate a potentially adverse effect (and these are 
not “substantive” adverse effects, but administrative adverse effects via exacerbated case 
backlog), and only 5-7 spaces indicate the possibility of no change to the legislation. Three of 
these are the classifications for the proposal to enact no change and are thus present inherently.  
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D. Adoptability of Proposed Changes 
Adoptability, or the first part of the “adoptionimplementationimpact” framework, is 
the final piece of this analysis. This section is intended to complement Part C’s analysis. It will 
consider the potential for realization of the proposals given the potential impact explored in Part 
C and the opinions of relevant parties on the appropriate role of the TRIG provisions. Because 
there has been little discussion of specific proposals (with the exception of those in the Refugee 
Protection Act of 2010 and of some types of waivers) we will consider here the opinions of 
policymakers and legislators as expressed with regard to TRIG issues generally, and then reflect 
on the proposals in the context of these general opinions. Specifically, this section will first touch 
on issues of material support, which come primarily from a 2007 hearing on the material support 
bar itself, then move to a discussion of the proposed Refugee Protection Act of 2010, and end 
with a discussion of the waiver authority related to the TRIG provisions.  
The tension between the desire for change and the protection of continued discretionary 
authority will permeate this section. Any policy must inherently balance the goals of discretion 
and efficient implementation. Because the TRIG provisions already exist with a significant 
degree of discretionary authority on the part of government officials, a discussion of the 
adoptability of the proposals will necessarily consider whether discretionary authority would be 
limited or expanded, and whether or not this outcome is feasible in the political climate.125  
Much of the policy debate about further modification of the Tier III and related 
provisions have centered on the material support bar. In a 2007 hearing before the Senate 
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Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Human Rights and the Law, Senator Patrick Leahy 
D-VT, sponsor of the Refugee Protection Act of 2010, argued,  
we need to bring our laws back into alignment with our values. The revisions to the 
material support provisions that were included in the PATRIOT Act and the REAL ID 
Act undermine our Nation’s commitment to human rights. They are a reactionary, blunt-
instrument approach to a complex issue, and fear overcame common sense and our 
collective conscience.126 
 
In response, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Policy at DHS Paul Rosenzweig argued that the 
material support provision is vital to national security as it currently stands, and in the event that 
it is misapplied, the existing waiver authority may be enacted. 
Let me begin, if I may, by reiterating precisely why the material support provisions are so 
vital to our national security. One can define terrorism in two ways: either by listing an 
organization as a terrorist organization, or by defining the conduct that makes an 
organization a terrorist one. With respect to listing, we must recall that this Congress as 
well as the courts have said that such organizations are foreign organizations that engage 
in terrorist activity and are so tainted by their criminal conduct that any contribution to 
the organization is itself tainted. 
 
With regard to a definition of terrorism by conduct, you must also remember that the 
listing process is cumbersome and slow, not nearly fast enough to keep up with the 
mutating terrorist groupings. Thus, while al Qaeda is a listed terrorist organization, its 
many subsidiary groups such as al Qaeda in the Magreb are not. And, thus, support for 
those organizations is only captured within the prohibition about broader conduct 
definitions. 
 
Now, all that having been said, we are well aware at the Department that the material 
support bar has the potential to sweep too broadly and to prevent us from providing 
immigration benefits to those who are deserving of them and to whom the United States 
is and ought to be willing to provide refuge. Since my last testimony before the House in 
May of 2006, the administration has made substantial progress in assessing the material 
support problem and providing exemptions where appropriate.127 
 
If Rosenzweig’s testimony as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Policy at DHS is 
representative of overall agency opinion, it is possible to conclude that proposals which limit or 
effectively eliminate the material support to Tier III organizations are undesirable to DHS 
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officials, and less likely to be implemented given DHS’ major role in the implementation of 
TRIG provisions. Thus Proposals 3 and 4 will be resisted (as well as 2 and 5-8 to some extent, 
though these do not directly impact the material support provision, and/or may be resisted by 
DHS for other reasons). Though these officials do not legislate (and thus could not, without 
assistance from the Chief Executive or the Judiciary, block a majority-favored amendment) it is 
reasonable to conclude that such proposals will be considered less viable if the professional 
opinion of DHS officials is valued highly enough.  
Rosenzweig’s 2007 argument was, at its core, an argument for the continued 
discretionary authority of the executive agencies. He clearly advocates continued use of 
exemption authority over legislative change. Three years later, in a hearing before the Senate 
Committee on the Judiciary, Associate of Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker, LLP in 
Washington, D.C., Igor V. Timofeyev, argued in the same vein of continued discretionary 
authority against the proposals of the Refugee Protection Act of 2010. The Act proposed to 
eliminate the statutory Tier III provision, as well as to institute an exception for material support 
provided under duress.128 Timofeyev maintained that the amendments proposed by the Act 
would “restrict the Executive’s ability to respond to the rapidly mutating nature of terrorist 
threats.”129 He noted the opportunity inherent in broadly written immigration legislation: 
“whenever you have a provision in the law which is admittedly broad, it also means it gives the 
government a broader or better ability to actually keep the people who we do not want in this 
country out.”130  
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In response to concerns about the Refugee Protection Act of 2010, President of Refugees 
International and former member of Congress Dan Glickman argued that the legislation would 
not allow terrorists access to the U.S. immigration system despite the eliminations and 
modifications proposed by the Act, but did not directly address concern for discretionary 
authority.131 Contrastingly, Timofeyev dramatically predicted that elimination of bars to material 
support for undesignated terrorist groups (via the elimination of the Tier III provision) would 
lead to the necessary designation of such organizations as Tier I or II in order to prevent 
individuals gaining access to the refugee/immigration systems. Timofeyev, like Rosenzweig in 
2007, preferred the waiver process for correcting inappropriate inadmissibility findings to the 
complete elimination of the Tier III inadmissibility.132 
The waiver authority was instituted by Congress, and it is clearly the preferred method of 
DHS officials for resolving the effective bars to refugees and asylum seekers, as well as the over-
breadth of the definition of an undesignated terrorist organization. In an extreme instance, 
Rosenzweig even advocated for the dramatic expansion of DHS’s waiver authority (but not for 
any corresponding statutory reform).  
…the administration has submitted a legislative proposal, the details of which get into the 
intricacies of sub-sections and sub-sub-sections of the INA. But, broadly speaking, today 
the exemption authority that the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Homeland 
Security have is limited to just a few subsets of terrorist-based exemptions. We may 
exempt, for example, material support provisions. We may also exempt from that people 
who are representatives of other groups who espouse—who engage in political speech. 
We lack the authority to waive the application with respect to INA 212(a)(3)(B)—I think 
that is right—which is the provision that prohibits us from admitting anybody who has 
carried arms. The structure of the administration’s proposal is essentially to take off all 
those limitations and to say, as broad as is the exclusion authority for people who engage 
in support or otherwise are related to terrorist activity, make our exemption authority 
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identically commensurate. If you do that, we will be able to exercise that authority with 
respect to the people who have yet to have the relief that they have sought.133 
 
In 2010, Timofeyev argued similarly to Rosenzweig that the waiver authority, in addition 
to already being available to a number of categories of persons, allows greater discretion to 
governmental officials while providing the same type of relief from the provision when enacted 
as would statutory reform. 
Importantly, unlike the proposed bill, the waiver authority permits the Executive to 
impose additional restrictions on these exemptions, such as the requirement that the 
applicant had not participated in, or provided material support to, activities that targeted 
noncombatant civilians. The existing waiver process also permits the Executive to obtain, 
where necessary, an all-source evaluation of the group to which the applicant provided 
support, and of its aims and methods, including its coercion techniques. In addition, the 
existing waivers provide adjudicators with discretion to evaluate the totality of the 
applicant’s circumstances when deciding whether to grant an exemption.134 
 
However, the waiver/exemption authority has not been free of grievances. In testimony 
before the Senate Judiciary Committee on May 6, 2009, and in response to Congresspersons 
dissatisfaction with its implementation of the waiver authority, Secretary Napolitano merely 
promised to “review” the waiver authority (which was not expanded to reflect Rosenzweig’s 
2007 suggestions).135 
By 2010 Congresspersons (as well as civil society) were still unimpressed with both the 
speed of the implementation of the waiver authority and the extent of its use. An exchange 
between Chairman Leahy and Timofeyev during the May 2010 hearing is important in 
illustrating the generally mutual concern for overbroad application of TRIG provisions and the 
resultant necessity of waivers, but the disagreement over their implementation and use. 
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Chairman LEAHY. And, Mr. Timofeyev, you mentioned the waiver and exemption 
authority to the material support bar. Those amendments were written by Senator Kyl and 
myself. 
 
You are correct in saying the implementation of the waiver process has been slow; 6,000 
cases are still stuck in limbo. That is why I tend to disagree with you that a change in the 
statute is unnecessary. 
 
But I think there is one area we should agree on. You mentioned the waiver authority can 
be improved for individuals in immigration court proceedings. 
 
What are some of the things that they could do to improve it? Assuming we keep with the 
present law, what are some of the things we could do to improve it and get past that 6,000 
case backlog? 
 
Mr. TIMOFEYEV. Mr. Chairman, first, I would like to note that I agree with Mr. 
Glickman that, I think, in this area, you have to proceed very carefully because of the 
important considerations of national security.… 
 
With respect to your immediate question, I agree, as you mentioned, that the waiver 
process should have been implemented faster. I think, particularly, from 2006, when I 
was in the Bush Administration, we slowly put that process underway. 
 
I think now the executive has significant history, significant experience in how to operate 
that process in a way that comports with national security, but allows admission and 
application of waivers to deserving individuals. 
 
I think with respect to, specifically, immigration court processing, one suggestion I would 
make, which I do not believe is yet the case, is I think there should be a way to allow for 
an adjudication of these waivers early in the process, not waiting until an individual who 
is in removal proceedings has his final order of deportation. 
 
I think it should be feasible to have a system where the consideration of whether or not 
that individual is eligible for a waiver of material support of other terrorist admissibility 
bars can be made early in the process. 
 
I think that is one concrete suggestion that under the legislation that, as you mentioned, 
you and Senator Kyl worked on, the executive currently has authority to do.136 
 
Timofeyev further argued that the exemption authority allows the administration to respond to 
case-by-case and unforeseen issues, and such is why the implementation of waiver authority was 
slow.137 
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 It is clear, despite the nuances of the debate, that the waiver authority is favored by those 
advocating for discretionary authority (as the sole or sufficient solution) as well as those 
advocating for the elimination of bars to legitimate refugee and asylum claims (generally as part 
of a broader schemata of proposals). Thus Proposal 2 appears viable, though it was not among 
the most impactful proposals per the evaluation in Part C. 
These few brief statements outline the primary, public discussions being had in the policy 
community about the nature of the Tier III and related inadmissibility statutes and potential 
changes to be made. It is clear both through these statements and the impact analysis above, that 
change is desirable, but the extent and method is hotly debated. Even in the statements of those 
most concerned with discretionary authority—e.g. those more likely to be opposed to changes 
that lessen the discretionary authority currently allotted by the TRIG provisions—one detects 
concern for instances in which Tier III should not apply (by that individual’s moral or political 
judgment) and yet is enacted. Accordingly, changes to the TRIG statutes which might prevent 
this from happening or limit its occurrence are favorable to persons all along the continuum of 
the debate. Therefore Proposal 1 which does not suggest any change and does not make an effort 
to correct any current misapplication of Tier III is unlikely to be favored by most parties to the 
debate. 
As a result of the adaptability analysis, some conclusions can be reached. For instance, 
Proposal 2 for expansion of the waiver/exemption authority would be the clear favorite among 
DHS officials given its preservation of discretionary authority and its ability to address ongoing 
criticisms. However, Congresspersons and civil society are likely to desire more action than 
waiver issuance as a result of ongoing grievance with the current state of the waiver/exemption 
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authority. “More action” might come in the form of Proposals 3-8. However, as noted previously, 
limitations imposed on the material support bar are unfavorable to DHS officials, at least in 
comparison to the use of waivers/exemptions, so Proposals 3 and 4 which directly limit the 
material support provision and 5-8 which indirectly limit it are likely to be resisted. (Proposal 8 
would remove the inadmissibility for support to Tier III organizations completely.) 
Beyond these conclusions, it is necessary to estimate the Congressional and agency 
opinions regarding the proposals. For instance, we are unsure how the DHS officials who 
testified might view the institution of intent or national security elements into the Tier III 
definition. However, it is possible to conjecture that because such a direct modification to the 
statutory language would limit discretionary authority in cases where a direct threat to national 
security cannot be found and/or intent cannot be proven, DHS officials would find such a change 
unfavorable at this time. Congresspersons, being pressured by civil society, might favor the 
proposal. In a similar fashion, the limitations to discretion imposed by the Non-Retroactivity 
Proposal which precludes any activity taking place prior to a certain date; the Designated List 
Proposal which would require that the organization be on or added to the list to be considered 
inadmissible under Tier III in any given immigration case; and the Removal of Tier III Proposal, 
would likely be unacceptable to agency or adjudicating officials.  
 One important final note is that it is very unclear how the interpretive changes proposed 
in the de minimis proposal (3) or in the retroactivity proposal (6) are viewed by the policy 
communities. Such interpretations have amounted to successful defenses in immigration courts, 
but it is unknown how, for instance, the issuance of a directive allowing for the interpretation of 
such would fare in Congress or at the Department of Homeland Security.  Given that such 
proposals would retain discretionary authority and that they would serve to limit the extent of the 
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damage done by the three primary criticisms in immigration cases, they might be viewed 
similarly to the proposals for expanded waiver and exemption authority. However, because they 
are less well-defined than the codifications which constitute exemptions and waivers, it is 
possible that they would be less favored by Congress in its oversight function, and by individuals 
reviewing and adjudicating immigration cases because of the inherent ambiguity and lack of 
legislative support. 
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VI. Recommendations 
 
Using the impact analysis in Part C, and the brief consideration of adoptability in Part D, 
this section will put forth a recommendation for which of the proposed policies should be 
adopted. 
Part D made clear the fact that changes to the waiver authority are desired, and are the 
most politically viable of the contending policy options. This project therefore proposes that 
implementation of changes to the TRIG statutes begin with changes to the waiver authority 
(Proposal 2) which will extend waivers to new classes of Tier III cases. Because expansion of the 
waiver authority would likely induce a greater accumulation and delay of immigration cases, this 
should not be a permanent solution. Consequently, this recommendation also suggests that the 
expanded waiver authority be available to the three relevant principals (the Secretaries of State 
and Homeland Security and the Attorney General) and that the authority be delegated to 
appropriate government officials which should serve to limit delays. There should also be 
continued issuance of categorical exemptions for whom the Tier III determination is considered 
unjust or inappropriate. Because Proposal 2 did not show the potential to impact the primary 
criticism of the TRIG provisions (Criticism 1), after a period of successful implementation of 
these authorities, a review of their use and success should determine which of the other proposals 
should be adopted. The adoption of further proposals is contingent upon the effects of the 
expansion of the waiver authority. 
Firstly, the waiver authority should be made to extend to different types of TRIG cases 
(e.g. material support provided inadvertently or cases of terrorist activity taking place prior to 
2001). As advocated by Paul Rosenzweig in 2007, this proposal recommends that the totality of 
the waiver authority be as broad as the exclusion authority represented by the TRIG provisions. 
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Such allows the legislative provisions to maintain the broadest possible application authority, but 
also accords additional authority and discretion to government officials to determine the 
provisions inapplicable in certain cases.  
The institution of such a proposal should proceed by analyzing what types of cases are 
currently held in immigration proceedings—whether most are persons who were involved 
directly with an undesignated terrorist organization or who provided material support to one. In 
the case of an individual who was a member of a Tier III organization, it should be noted 
whether the provision was applied retroactively in his case, or whether the elements of national 
security threat or intent are present. In the cases of material support, it is important to consider 
whether the support was provided under duress, at an insignificant level, inadvertently, or by a 
child or a relative of the individual to whom the support was given.138 
While these determinations are somewhat subjective, consideration of the number of 
cases which qualify for certain types of waivers is important for deciding which types of waiver 
authorities to create and in what order they should be created—the most common types of cases 
should receive waiver authority first. It is necessary for the efficient exercise of the authority to 
issue separate waivers for each type of case, though in the end the total waiver authority should 
mirror the exclusion authority. The proposals considered in this analysis are an excellent source 
for types of waiver authority to consider, given that they represent aspects of the TRIG statutes 
which are the most disagreeable or problematic and for which waivers would be most useful.  
The following is a list of the waiver authorities which should be produced and be made 
available to the Secretaries of State and Homeland Security as well as the Attorney General—or 
to those principals with authority at different stages of the immigration process. (These 
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suggestions are made based on the research performed as part of this project, and the proposals 
made so far in the literature. However, the list should be altered based on the findings of the 
case-specific research suggested above.) They are divided into two categories: waivers for 
aspects of the material support provision (§212(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI)) and waivers for aspects of the 
Tier III provision (§212(a)(3)(B)(vi)(III)). 
 
Related to Material Support: 
• A waiver for material support provided at or below a de minimis level of support (as 
determined on a case-by-case basis by the consular or immigration officials reviewing the 
case and reviewed by a principal or an individual with his/her delegated authority). 
• A waiver for material support provided under duress. 
• A waiver for material support provided inadvertently. 
• A waiver for material support provided below an age at which consent can be freely 
given. 
• A waiver for material support provided to a member of a Tier III terrorist organization by 
a relative of that individual. 
 
Related to the Tier III provision: 
• A waiver for cases in which there is no threat to national security nor credible intent to 
inflict harm on the U.S., its infrastructure, or its citizenry. 
• A waiver for cases in which the Tier III provision is applied retroactively. 
 
 These waivers should be exercised, as are currently available waivers, only in cases 
where the totality of the circumstances merits the exception—that is where the only bar to the 
individual’s admissibility is the one which the waiver resolves, and where immigration officials 
have no outstanding concerns. One should not expect this proposed expansion of the waiver 
authority to be as contentious as proposals to modify the statutory authority to reflect the content 
of the above proposed waivers. This is because the waivers expand the authority of officials to 
determine the relevant bar inapplicable, but they do not remove the authority to apply the bar in 
the first place. Therefore, discretion is actually expanded with the proliferation of waivers, and 
not decreased as it could be with the implementation of similar statutory reforms. 
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 One glaring issue, as noted in Part C, is that the expansion of the waiver authority has the 
potential to exacerbate an already problematic accumulation of cases in immigration proceedings. 
This is why the waiver authority should be delegated to more government officials than just the 
principals, and why the modification is merely the first of the here-proposed steps to modify the 
TRIG provisions.  
 The waivers for various types of TRIG cases, as opposed to categorical exemptions to 
Tier III groups, have more wide-reaching effects and accord greater discretion to adjudicating 
officials. This is because the waivers may also apply to members of groups eligible for 
categorical exemptions, and do not limit their exercise only to specific groups of people. 
However, the continued issuance of exemptions to various groups is useful in the political arena 
and is a complement to the proposed expansion of the waiver authority. It provides a public 
acknowledgment of either a mistaken application of TRIG provisions or of the inapplicability of 
the provisions in that case—given the merits of the groups’ cause, the circumstances under 
which the relevant events took place, the U.S.’s political concerns or any other number of 
relevant instances. Therefore the issuance of categorical exemptions should continue as cases of 
groups inappropriately determined inadmissible by the Tier III provision continue to arise. The 
determination of which groups are eligible should be left to the experts at DOS, DHS, and DOJ 
who possess the relevant intelligence, political awareness and resources, and historical and 
institutional knowledge. 
After this proposed expansion of the waiver/exemption authority has been implemented 
for a significant period of time during which its exercise becomes routine, consideration of 
further modification to the TRIG provisions can be had. At this point, records will exist for the 
instances in which the waiver authority is exercised. The statutory changes corresponding to 
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those types of waivers used most commonly and successfully—with little controversy and with 
fair efficiency—should be implemented. (These may require the creation of different proposals 
than those explored as part of this project, for instance the implementation of an exception for 
inadvertently provided material support.)  This secondary wave of change can also be 
implemented slowly, with regard to the discretionary authority of adjudicating officials. For 
example, a waiver which has only been used once or twice would not be appropriate to institute 
as a statutory reform, as the discretionary authority continues to be necessary. 
Given that the waiver authority produces an accumulation of immigration cases under 
review, further modification of the TRIG provisions should aim to phase out the necessity of the 
waiver authority. For instance, if the waiver for material support provided under duress is 
exercised most often, the Proposal to institute a duress exception (Proposal 4) should be 
implemented. This shifts the burden from immigration court proceedings and principal review 
outward to consular and immigration officials in the field, receiving applications for immigration 
status. Ultimately, the reduction in case backlog and the improvements regarding Criticisms 1 
and 2 as a result of these statutory reforms represent ameliorative changes to the legislation with 
sensitivity both to discretion and to the most common criticisms. 
It is impossible to speculate which of the waiver authorities will be used most often with 
any degree of certainty without access to immigration case records. It is also difficult to guess 
how, given successful implementation of the waiver authority, the support for a corresponding 
proposal (e.g. proposals 3-6) will change, if at all. The hope is that with frequent and successful 
exercise of the waiver authority, the corresponding proposal will come to seem less drastic and 
more viable than it is currently, given the discussions reviewed by Part D. The more drastic 
impact will come with the implementation of these later proposals. The statutory/interpretive 
McCarthy 92 
 
reform will result in more instances of use as they are not subject to discretionary 
implementation. This will also appease some of the main critics of the legislation, especially with 
regard to the over-breadth of the Tier III definition and the effective bars to refugee and asylum, 
or Criticisms 1 and 2. 
 This analysis illustrates the overall impracticality of Proposals 1 and 8. Proposal 1, as 
noted above, is favored neither by those wishing to produce radical change in the TRIG 
provisions, nor by those hoping to maintain discretionary authority. Proposal 8 was argued 
against directly in the Senate Committee Hearing on the Refugee Protection Act of 2010 in 
which it was proposed. Despite its drastic impact on the three primary criticisms of the 
legislation, it is not a politically viable solution at this time.  
 This analysis also illustrates the difficulty of instituting Proposals 3-7 without the 
institution of the preliminary, corresponding waiver authority, the conclusions regarding which 
are more nuanced, as they sit along the continuum of limiting discretionary authority and 
producing ameliorative change with respect to the primary criticisms of the TRIG provisions. 
Based on the exploration of adoptability in Part D, those proposals which restrict the definitions 
of an undesignated terrorist organization (3, 4 and potentially 7 indirectly, and 5 directly) and 
which limit the applicability of the material support provision (3 and 4 directly, 5, 6 and 
potentially 7 indirectly) are unfavorable to DHS officials on the grounds that discretionary 
authority is too severely restricted. However, each is potentially able to produce changes to the 
TRIG provisions favorable to civil society, Congress, and even DHS and other agency officials 
in particular cases (i.e. cases where the TRIG provisions are seen as unfairly or irrationally 
applied). Proposals 4, 5, and 7 have the potential to ameliorate all three criticisms, while 3 and 6 
would alleviate two of the three. 
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In order to know which of Proposals 3 through 6 are more viable—on grounds other than 
their affect on discretionary authority—the institution of an expanded waiver authority will be 
helpful as a test of usefulness and viability. This test, in proving the viability of some proposals, 
will be productive in reducing resistance to them, thus making the more adoptable than they are 
currently. Proposal 7 would not be tested by the institution of this waiver authority. However, its 
implementation would likely eliminate almost all discretionary authority except in the 
creation/modification of the list itself, and thus its adoption is highly unlikely in the near future, 
even after a trial period.  
In conclusion, it is clear that the most acceptable proposal is currently Proposal 2 for the 
expansion of waiver/exemption authority. This expansion allows some of the criticisms of the 
legislation to be alleviated. It would limit the number of cases of material support inadmissibility, 
and while it would not systematically limit the Tier III definition, it would shrink the net of Tier 
III cases. The institution of expanded waivers might initially increase the bureaucratic case 
backlog, but such appears a necessary and acceptable trade-off for the retention of discretionary 
authority. This expanded waiver/exemption authority should be followed by more drastic 
changes, or the institution of the statutory reforms corresponding to the successfully 
implemented waiver authority. The implementation of changes would reflect a boost of the Tier 
III and related inadmissibility’s reputation in the academic and policy communities, and the 
recommendations offered here provide a method through which discretion can be maintained 
while simultaneously positive changes may be enacted.  
Perhaps if these changes had been implemented earlier, Nelson Mandela may not have 
been barred from entry to the U.S. by the TRIG provisions. Saman Kareem Ahmad may have 
been granted asylum after his assistance to the U.S. marines. With the institution of these 
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proposed changes, the INA’s Tier III and related inadmissibilities may begin to function to bar 
only those representatives or supporters of terrorist organizations who truly represent a threat to 
the United States. With the institution of these proposed changes, the INA might more closely 
reflect the conscience of the U.S., which has a history of demonstrating its openness to 
immigrants, and which ultimately values equity and justice for all. 
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Appendix 1 
A brief look into the social movement literature reveals a possible alternative 
categorization of the groups classified as Tier III terrorist organizations. Indeed conventional 
definitions of social movements can be argued to relate at least as closely to the Tier III 
definition of terrorist organizations as conventional definitions of terrorism. Several definitions 
of social movements are contained in Table A.1. 
 
Table A.1 Definitions of Social Movements 
  
Heberle (1951)* 
A genuine social movement…is always integrated by a 
set of constitutive ideas, or an ideology, although bonds 
of other nature may not be absent. …A social 
movement…need not be restricted to a particular state or 
national society. In fact, all major social movements have 
extended over the entire sphere of Western civilization 
and even beyond. 
  
  
  
  
Wilkinson (1971)* 
A social movement is a deliberate collective endeavor to 
promote change in any direction and by any means, not 
excluding violence, illegality, revolution or withdrawal 
into “utopian” community… A social movement’s 
commitment to change, the raison d’être of its 
organization are founded upon the conscious volition, 
normative commitment to the movements aims or 
beliefs, and active participation on the part of the 
followers or members. 
  
  
  
  
Tilly (1979)* 
A social movement is "a sustained series of interactions 
between national powerholders and persons successfully 
claiming to speak on behalf of a constituency lacking 
formal representation, in the course of which those 
persons make publicly-visible demands for changes in 
the distribution or exercise of power, and back those 
demands with public demonstrations of support.” 
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Zirakzadeh 
(1997)** 
A social movement has three distinct characteristics, 
including: 1) a group of people who consciously attempt 
to build a radically new social order, 2) the political 
activity stems from a broad range of social backgrounds, 
generally comprised of the ‘non-elite’ an 3) the 
movement utilizes politically confrontational and socially 
disruptive tactics. 
  
  
  
  
Dieter-Opp 
(2009)*** 
A social movement is "a collectivity of actors who want to 
achieve their goal or goals by influencing the decisions of a 
target." (Dieter Opp begins with this definition and adds 
elements of size, longevity, and formal organization dependent 
upon the research.) 
  *Tilly, Charles. 1979. “Social Movements and National Politics.” Working Paper No. 197 Center for Research on Social Organization. 
**Zirakzadeh, Cyrus Ernesto. 1997. Social Movements in Politics: A Comparative Study. New York: Longman. 
 ***Dieter-Opp, Karl. 2009. Theories of Political Protest and Social Movements: A Multidisciplinary Introduction, Critique, and Synthesis. New 
York: Routledge. 
 
Each of the above definitions of a social movement includes both the desire for and 
momentum toward political or social change. None of these definitions excludes the use of 
violence, political motives, or effects beyond the immediate victims, which were the three 
common elements to each of the terrorism definitions above. The Tier III definition then, which 
also does not specifically require, but does not exclude those three elements, may be considered 
in some ways more similar to the definitions of a social movement (dependent upon whether the 
social movement carries out terrorist activities as defined by the INA and included in the Tier III 
definition). However, it is important to recognize that each of the definitions of a social 
movement recognizes a motivation, generally a political or social one, and notes that the 
activities of the movement are generally carried out by an organized group. Therefore the Tier III 
definition is also, in some ways, broader than the definition of a social movement. This 
intersection of definitions is critically important in examining the activities of groups barred by 
the Tier III inadmissibility provisions. 
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Highlighting the overlapping nature of the definitions of social movements and the 
previously analyzed definitions of terrorism, Martha Crenshaw defines terrorism in her 1990 
chapter “Questions, research, and knowledge” more similarly to the above definitions of social 
movements than to the earlier presented definitions of terrorism. She states “terrorism is not…the 
action of an individual. Acts of terrorism are committed by groups who reach collective 
decisions based on commonly held beliefs, although the level of individual commitment to a 
group and its beliefs varies. It is a political act performed by individuals acting together and 
collectively trying to justify their behavior.”139 Crenshaw leaves out notions of both violence and 
the production of fear among the targeted population and focuses primarily on the socio-
psychological aspects of terrorism just as the definitions of social movements to not require these 
elements. Crenshaw does include the notion of terrorism as a political act, which is consistent 
with Schmid and Jongman, Hoffman, and Wardlaw’s definitions.  
This brief review of definitions of social movements may lead us to conjecture that some 
groups were relieved of the “undesignated terrorist organization” determination via categorical 
exemptions because they qualified, alternatively or more broadly, as social or political 
movements more so than as organized perpetrators of terrorism. Such a reclassification would 
not absolve the groups of violence or even of terrorist activity, but would point to the breadth of 
the Tier III definition in classifying groups. 
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